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THE NON-FIRST AMENDMENT LAW
OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Genevieve Lakier*
The First Amendment dominates debate about freedom of speech in the United States.
Yet it is not the only legal instrument that protects expressive freedom, the rights of the
institutionalpress, or the democratic values that these rights facilitate. A rich body of
local, state, and federal laws also does so, and does so in ways the First Amendment does
not.
This Article explores the history and present-day operation of this non-First
Amendment body of free speech law. Doing so changes our understanding of both the past
and the present of the American free speech tradition. It reveals that there was more legal
protectionfor speech in the nineteenth century than scholars have assumed. It also makes
evident that the contemporary system of free expression is much more majoritarian,and
much more pluralistin its conception of what freedom of speech means and requires, than
what we commonly assume. Recognizing as much is important not only as a descriptive
matter but also as a doctrinal one. This is because in few other areas of constitutional
law does the Supreme Court look more to history to guide its interpretationof the meaning
of the right. And yet, the Court's view of the relevant regulatoryhistory is impoverished.
Missingfrom the Court's understanding of freedom of speech is almost any recognition of
the important nonconstitutional mechanisms that legislators have traditionally used to
promote it. The result is a deeply inconsistent body of First Amendment law that relies
on a false view of both our regulatory present and our regulatorypast - and is therefore
able to proclaim a commitment to laissez-faire principles that, in reality, it has never been
able to sustain.

INTRODUCTION

discusboth popular and scholarly
dominates
Amendment
he
sionFirst
of freedom
of speech
in the United States. If one takes a look
at the tremendous amount of writing that has been produced to analyze,
celebrate, or deplore how expressive freedom has been legally guaranteed in this country, one will quickly see that the vast majority of it
focuses on the Free Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment
and the judicial opinions that interpret and give those clauses force.
It is easy enough to understand why discussion of freedom of speech
and press has tended to be so First Amendment-centric. 1 The Free

T
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1 Although the text of the First Amendment distinguishes between the "freedom of speech"
protected by the Free Speech Clause and the "freedom of press" protected by the Press Clause, in
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Speech Clause of the First Amendment has for decades now served as
one of the most powerful mechanisms of individual rights protection in
the Federal Constitution. It has been interpreted to apply to a dizzying
variety of kinds of speech and expressive conduct. Today, the First
Amendment protects not only explicitly political speech and journalism
but also religious speech, artistic speech, scientific speech, most forms of
popular entertainment, nonobscene pornography, commercial advertisements, and even nude dancing.2 The strength and size of the modern
First Amendment have given it a powerful cultural status. 3 They also
make it easy to equate the free speech tradition in the United States with
the First Amendment tradition. 4
Like the sun, the First
Amendment's size and brightness tend to blot out all else.
It is nevertheless a mistake to presume that the only legal mechanism
that protects freedom of speech in the United States is the First
Amendment. This is because, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the
federal courts do not possess a monopoly over the interpretation and
enforcement of the rights to freedom of speech and press or the penumbral right of association. In its 1976 decision Hudgens v. NLRB, 5 the
Court made clear that "statutory or common law may in some situations
extend protection or provide redress against [efforts] to abridge . . . free
expression" even when the First Amendment does not do so. 6 A few
years later, in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,' the Court similarly concluded that state constitutions might provide "rights in
expression" that are "more expansive than those conferred by the
Federal Constitution."
The result is that speakers and listeners can, and sometimes do, receive more protection for their speech, press, and expressive association

its First Amendment cases, the Court has generally refused to distinguish between the two. See
Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1027-29 (2011). The result
has been to make freedom of press and freedom of speech merely different ways of describing the
same underlying bundle of rights. Although good arguments have been made for why it is a mistake
to equate freedom of speech with freedom of press, for simplicity's sake, and in order to better
reflect how the terms are used in contemporary constitutional discourse, in this Article I do just
that. References to freedom of speech should be understood to include the rights that might otherwise be understood, and historically were referred to, as freedom of press.
2 See Genevieve Lakier, Sport as Speech, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1109, 1111, 1114 (2014).
3 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A PreliminaryExploration
of ConstitutionalSalience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1790 (2004).
4 See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN

AMERICA 6 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988) (referring to the First Amendment tradition as simply the
"free speech tradition"); Owen M. Fiss, Essay, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV.
1405, 1405 (1986) (conflating Professor Kalven's "free speech tradition" with First Amendment
jurisprudence).
5 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
6 Id. at 513.
7 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
8 Id. at 81; see also id. at 88.
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under state constitutional law, state and federal statutory law, and state
common law than they do under the First Amendment. Although state
constitutional law has proven to be less of an important source of free
speech protection than some hoped or predicted after the PruneYard
decision, 9 courts in New Jersey, California, and a number of other states
have for many decades now interpreted state constitutional guarantees
of expressive freedom to confer rights that the First Amendment does
not confer.1 0 More importantly, local, state, and federal legislators have
over the course of the past two centuries enacted hundreds, perhaps
even thousands, of laws that are intended to protect the same values and
interests that the First Amendment protects. In some cases, legislators
have also empowered regulatory agencies to do the same. To focus solely
on the protection that the First Amendment provides is therefore to misunderstand how freedom of speech is actually understood and legally
protected in the United States today.1 1
This Article attempts to correct this misunderstanding - or, at least,
to begin the process of doing so - by exploring both the genealogical
roots and the present-day operation of what it calls the non-First
Amendment law of freedom of speech. 1 2 The term refers to the many
local, state, and federal laws that work to protect the same interests that
the Free Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment protect.
These laws do so not by simply enforcing the speech rights and speechfacilitating duties that the First Amendment requires, but by granting
rights and imposing duties that the First Amendment does not require,

9 Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private
Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1579 (1998).
10 See, e.g., Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 172 P.3 d 742, 749 (Cal. 2007); Green Party of
N.J. v. Hartz Mountain Indus., Inc., 752 A.2d 315, 323 (N.J. 2000).
11 This Article leaves entirely undiscussed another, also extremely important, domestic free
speech tradition: namely, the tradition of private self-regulation that promotes free speech values in
schools and universities, in the private media, and in a variety of other institutional settings. Like
the free speech laws documented in this Article, institutional free speech policies play an important
role in promoting free speech values in contexts where the First Amendment does not do so, particularly in the private sphere. They also serve as the terrain on which important debates about the
meaning of free speech occur. To fully understand how freedom of speech is imagined, contested,
and protected in the United States, one would need therefore to understand the relationship between
three important strands of free speech law - the First Amendment, the non-First Amendment,
and the private. For purposes of space, however, I leave exploration of this important third strand
of the American system of free expression for another day.
12 As will become evident, in what follows I provide only a cursory account of this capacious,
contentious, and diverse body of free speech law. This Article is intended to open up exploration
of this free speech tradition, not to provide the last word on it. In doing so, I follow the lead of two
scholars who previously suggested, albeit in a much less fleshed-out form, the existence of a nonFirst Amendment free speech tradition. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in
the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101, 107 (igg);
TIM WU, BROOKINGS INST., IS FILTERING
CENSORSHIP? THE SECOND FREE SPEECH TRADITION 2 (2Q10), https://www.brookings.edu/

research/is-filtering-censorship-the-second-free-speech-tradition

[https://perma.cc/7Y7S-465L].

BEYOND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

202 1]

2303

or by intervening in the speech marketplace in other ways not mandated
by the First Amendment cases.
As I show in what follows, this body of non-First Amendment free
speech law is extensive in its scope and significant in its effects. It also
has deep roots in our regulatory traditions.
In fact, the non-First
Amendment free speech tradition is for all practical purposes older than
the First Amendment tradition itself.
In contrast to the First
Amendment tradition, which began to emerge in its modern form only
in the early decades of the twentieth century, legislatures acted to protect
the interests that we today recognize the First Amendment as protecting
beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, and continued to do so
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in all sorts of ways.
This fact complicates the dominant narratives of the history of freedom of speech in the United States, which tend to depict the years prior
to the early twentieth century as a period in which there was little legal
protection for expressive freedom. 13
It is absolutely true that
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century courts tended to interpret constitutional free expression guarantees to grant speakers and listeners few
rights against the government.14 But legislators proved much less insensitive to the need to protect expressive freedom, and the democratic
freedoms that it enabled, against both government and private power
than did the courts. Indeed, what we find during this period is significant and enduring legislative concern about the threat that the concentration of economic power produced by the increasing industrialization
of the U.S. economy posed to the expressive freedom of the less powerful, as well as to the well-being of the institutional press.1 5 The result
was the creation of a rich body of nonconstitutional free speech law. To
write legislative efforts to promote freedom of speech and press out of
the history of freedom of speech in the United States is therefore to miss
much of the story.
Paying attention to the non-First Amendment law of freedom of
speech not only changes our understanding of the history of the free
speech tradition in the United States, however. It also complicates our

13 See,

e.g.,

AMENDMENT

PAUL

L. MURPHY,

FREEDOMS

THE

MEANING

FROM WILSON

TO

OF

FDR 4

FREEDOM
(1972)

OF SPEECH:

('In America,

FIRST

freedom

of

speech . . . [was] an operational reality largely outside the area of either legal definition or restriction
from the adoption of the Bill of Rights until World War I. . . . [F]reedom of speech was treated as a
dearly won prize, protected in a symbolic trophy case, but not used from day to day."); Lawrence
M. Friedman, Lecture, The Constitution and American Legal Culture, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 5-6
(1987) (noting that very few free speech cases reached the courts in the nineteenth century, and
concluding that "structured controversy over the limits of free speech was largely absent as an overt
political issue").
14 See David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 9o YALE L.J. 514, 52324 (1981).
15 See, e.g., infra p. 2320.
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understanding of its present. This is because what it shows us is that
the modern free speech tradition is considerably more pluralist in its
conception of the right, and more majoritarian in its operation, than we
are accustomed to recognizing.
In its First Amendment cases, the Court has articulated, since at least
the 1940s, a strongly counter-majoritarian and court-centric conception
of freedom of speech. It has argued that what the ratification of the
First Amendment was intended to do was remove the question of what
freedom of speech means from "the vicissitudes of political controversy"
and transform it instead into "a legal principle to be applied by the
courts." 16 The Court has insisted, more generally, that the meaning of
freedom of speech is not something that "may . .. be submitted to vote"
or made to "depend on the outcome of . .. elections.""
The Court has never explained how its view of freedom of speech as
a right whose meaning must "depend on the outcome of no elections" 8
coexists with its recognition that often popularly elected state courts and
state and federal legislatures may grant rights of free expression that the
First Amendment does not. 19 Nevertheless, scholars have largely accepted the Court's claim that what freedom of speech means in the
United States at least as a legal matter is what the First
Amendment cases say it means. 20 But this is a mistake.
In fact, once we look beyond the First Amendment cases, what we
find is significant debate, from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
until today, about what freedom of speech means and requires. More
than that: what we find are legal protections for speech and association
that are based on a different conception of freedom of speech than that
given voice in the First Amendment cases - one that is much more
concerned with the threat that private economic power poses to expressive freedom, and much less laissez-faire in its understanding of the government's responsibilities vis-a-vis the marketplace of ideas.
The non-First Amendment laws, policies, and judicial decisions
chronicled in this Article do not, in other words, simply build on top of
the federal constitutional "floor" - to use the famous metaphor that

16 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (198o); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507, 513 (1976).
20 The tendency to believe the Court that it has a monopoly over the meaning of the free speech
right is as common among the critics of the modern First Amendment tradition as it is among those
who believe the tradition to be a "worthy" one. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Essay, Can Free
Speech Be Progressive?, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2219, 2220 (2018) (defining the American free speech
tradition to mean the First Amendment tradition, and concluding that it both has not been and
likely can never be progressive); see also Fiss, supra note 4, at 1405-08 (same).
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Justice Brennan developed to describe what he viewed as the ideal relationship between state and federal constitutional law. 21 Instead, they
reflect and, in some cases, explicitly articulate a different view of how it
is that the interests the First Amendment protects - chief among these,
the interest in democratic flourishing, but also the interest in individual
self-expression - should be realized. The result is a distinct and vibrant
tradition of free speech law - and one that, as I show in what follows,
is often quite difficult to reconcile with the principles that undergird the
modern First Amendment cases.
Recognizing as much is important not only as a descriptive matter
but also as a doctrinal one. This is because in few other areas of constitutional law does the Court look more to history to guide its interpretation of the meaning of the right. And yet, the Court's view of the relevant regulatory history is impoverished.
Missing from the Court's
understanding of freedom of speech is almost any recognition of the important nonconstitutional mechanisms that legislators have traditionally
used to promote it. This is true even though the political and cultural
power of the non-First Amendment body of free speech law has made
the Court loath in many contexts to constrain its application, even when
doing so is difficult to justify under existing First Amendment
principles.
The result is an inconsistent body of free speech law that manages
to reconcile the First Amendment and non-First Amendment free
speech traditions only by implausibly denying in many cases that nonFirst Amendment free speech laws affect any significant free speech interests at all. This is a problem not only because it produces incoherent
doctrinal distinctions but also because it permits the Court to proclaim
a commitment to principles - in particular, the principle of free speech
laissez-faire - that in reality it cannot sustain.
To craft a First Amendment doctrine that is capable of adequately
protecting freedom of speech in our complex democratic society, it is
necessary to first understand how that freedom of speech has in fact
historically been protected. That is the task that this Article takes up.
It proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the history and present operation of some of the laws that make up the non-First Amendment free
speech tradition. Part II examines the implications of the non-First
Amendment free speech tradition for how we think about the present,
and the past, of freedom of speech in the United States. Finally, Part
III argues that the failure of scholars to pay attention to the non-First
Amendment free speech tradition has made it too easy for the Supreme
Court to claim that the American free speech tradition is laissez-faire,
when the reality is far more complicated.

21 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions
as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 550 (1986).
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I. DECENTERING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Histories of freedom of speech in the United States tend to be written
as histories of the First Amendment. The First Amendment's ratification in '791, the fight over its meaning spurred by passage of the Alien
and Sedition Acts in 1798, the restrictive Blackstonian interpretation of
freedom of speech and press that courts adopted in the nineteenth century, and the radical changes to First Amendment doctrine that took
place in the early twentieth century - these are the events that structure
most histories of freedom of speech in this country.2 2 When other legal
mechanisms enter the story, they are usually discussed either as a threat
to freedom of speech or as a tableau on which to explore the competing
interpretations of the First Amendment that courts and others employed
during the period. 2 3
There are important exceptions to this rule. For example, historians
have shown considerable interest in how the state constitutional guarantees that provided the primary judicially enforced source of protection
for freedom of speech and press in the years prior to the First
Amendment's incorporation were interpreted by courts and others.2 4
Similarly, historians of the New Deal have explored how unions and
workers argued for, and in some cases won, rights of speech and association that were not grounded in the First Amendment. 25 For the most
part, however, both recent and not-so-recent histories of freedom of
speech in the United States tend to focus on the First Amendment, and
the First Amendment alone. 26

22 See,

e.g.,

MICHAEL

KENT

CURTIS,

FREE

SPEECH,

"THE

PEOPLE'S

DARLING

PRIVILEGE": STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000);
DONNA LEE DICKERSON, THE COURSE OF TOLERANCE:

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN

NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (i9go); STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2008); DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS
FORGOTTEN

YEARS (1997);

GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN

WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004).
23 See, e.g., DICKERSON, supra note 22, at 55-81.
24 See, e.g., NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 61-71 (1986); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of

Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543, 565-69 (2009).
25 See, e.g., Laura M. Weinrib,

Civil Liberties Outside the Courts, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 297,

323-24.
26 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER M. FINAN, FROM THE PALMER RAIDS TO THE PATRIOT ACT
A HISTORY OF THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (2007); LAURA WEINRIB, THE
TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA'S CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPROMISE (2016); THE FREE
SPEECH CENTURY (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2019).

Historians of the mass

media have paid significant attention to the non-First Amendment free speech laws that affect the
mass media.

See, e.g., ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 2-3 (1983);
SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM

RICHARD R. JOHN,

FRANKLIN TO MORSE 25-63 (1995); SAM LEBOVIC, FREE SPEECH AND UNFREE NEWS: THE
PARADOX OF PRESS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 6 (2016); Samantha Barbas, Creating the Public
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The First Amendment is not, however, the only legal mechanism that
protects, or has historically protected, the rights that its Free Speech and
Press Clauses guarantee - like the right of the individual to access uncensored "channels of communication,"2 or to take part in "free political
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of
the people," 28 or to decide what it is they do and do not say.29 These
rights are in fact protected in all kinds of ways, by all kinds of legal
instruments. To tell the legal history of freedom of speech in the United
States as an almost exclusively First Amendment story is to ignore many
of the other mechanisms that attempt to ensure that individuals can
meaningfully exercise the kind of expressive freedom that a democratic
society requires.
Consider for example the many laws that make it a crime to threaten
or intimidate another into, or out of, voting a certain way. Such laws
exist in virtually every state, 30 and similar prohibitions are written into
federal law also. 3 1 They are not required by the First Amendment, at
least not as it is currently understood. Even if the government did nothing to prevent private persons from using threats or intimidation to stop
others from voting, the victims of those threats and acts of intimidation
would have, in most cases, no cognizable First Amendment claim they
could bring against the government or, in all likelihood, anyone
else - under existing state action rules. 32 And yet, it obviously is the
case that voter intimidation laws protect a right that the Supreme Court
has insisted is a "major purpose" 33 of the First Amendment to protect:

Forum, 44 AKRON L. REV. 809, 830-45 (2011). These works tend to devote relatively little attention, however, to what the regulatory regimes they explore reveal about legal as well as popular
understandings of freedom of speech and press in the period. Perhaps for this reason they have not
been well integrated into the broader body of free speech scholarship. This can and should change.
27 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946).
28 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
29 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by
the First Amendment . . . includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.").
30 See Barry H. Weinberg & Lyn Utrecht, Problems in America's Polling Places: How They Can
Be Stopped, ii TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 401, 479-99 (2002) (listing the various state laws that
prohibit private interference with voting).
31 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 594; 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); 52 U.S.C. § 1030 (b).
7
32 In its state action cases, the Court has held that constitutional rights like the First Amendment
ordinarily do not protect against actions that are carried out by private persons, except when a
government actor "exercise[s] coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement . . . [to
the private actor] that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). Because this kind of encouragement will be lacking in most private voter
intimidation cases, it is very unlikely that the First Amendment would provide any protection to
the intimidated voter. The one exception to this rule is voter intimidation carried out by the political
party officials who operate party primaries, but even in such cases, the Court has made clear that
those officials count as state actors only while overseeing the primary election process. See Cal.
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572-73 (2000).
33 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
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they help "ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate
in and contribute to our republican system of self-government."3 4 Indeed, they protect perhaps the most crucial means of participation in
our republican system of self-government, what we might think of as
the core democratic expressive freedom: the right to vote.
These laws therefore can, and perhaps should, be thought of as nonFirst Amendment free speech laws: they protect expressive interests that
the First Amendment protects but do so by granting speech rights that
the First Amendment does not grant and by imposing speech-facilitating
duties that the First Amendment does not require. And they have done
so for many years - indeed, since before the First Amendment was
enacted. As Professor Eugene Volokh reports, in the mid- and late eighteenth century, a number of colonies made it a crime to "attempt to
overawe, affright, or force, any person qualified to vote, against his inclination or conscience," 3 5 and in the years after independence, many
states passed similar laws.3 6
The voter intimidation laws are not unique in this respect. Once one
starts to look, one finds many local, state, and federal laws that protect
expressive interests that the First Amendment protects but do so by
non-First Amendment means. Many of these laws also have deep roots
in our regulatory traditions.
This is not terribly surprising. The task of maintaining a democratic
society is a difficult one. It requires, among other things, extensive coordination between different government actors, and a sufficient flow of
information between the government and the people to enable citizens
to critically analyze the government's activities and to maintain control
over it (rather than the other way around). It also requires endless conversation between members of the body politic about the rules that do,
and should, govern society. It would be quite strange if the entire responsibility for ensuring the robust expressive freedom that must exist
in order for millions of people to be able to collectively govern themselves were borne by only one legal instrument, or even fifty-one. Nor
is this the situation we are confronted with.
Instead, legislatures, regulatory agencies, and courts have crafted
over the course of American history many different laws to protect the
expressive freedom that a democratic society requires. These laws have
largely been left out of the history of freedom of speech in the United
States because they do not tend to speak in a constitutional register or
acquire their authority from the constitutional text. It is time to stitch
them back into the story.

34 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 5g6, 604 (1982).
35 Eugene Volokh, Private Employees' Speech and Political Activity: Statutory Protection
Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 295, 297 (2012); see also id. at 297-300.
36 Id. at 300.
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This Part begins to do so, by exploring some of the laws that promote
free speech interests by non-First Amendment means. Because the nonFirst Amendment law of freedom of speech is as capacious, if not more
so, than the First Amendment itself, it would be impossible to provide
anything like a comprehensive survey of its provisions in one part of
one article. In what follows, I examine only a few of the many local,
state, and federal laws that protect free speech interests by non-First
Amendment means. Even looking at a relatively small sample of laws
should nevertheless make evident the richness, significance, and diversity of this primarily majoritarian free speech tradition, as well as the
marked differences in how the First Amendment and non-First
Amendment bodies of free speech law attempt to vindicate the same
values.
A. Postal Laws
A good place to look, to begin to get a sense of the significance and
scope of the non-First Amendment law of freedom of speech, is at federal postal policy, particularly the postal law of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Today the United States' mails are only one of the
many mechanisms through which information travels around the body
politic. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, however, the
post office was a vital information network - an institution whose importance to "the diffusion of knowledge, the control of public opinion,
and the dissemination of every species of truth" appeared "incalculable." 37 Federal postal policy determined how the post office performed
this important knowledge-diffusion role, and Congress shaped this policy quite self-consciously in an attempt to promote the same values that
the First Amendment protected.
This motivation becomes clear when one examines the arguments
made to explain and justify the Post Office Act of 1792,38 which undoubtedly represents the most significant piece of postal legislation ever
enacted in the United States. The Act, which was the culmination of
three years of legislative debate, 39 enacted a radical change to federal
postal policy. Prior to 1792, the American postal service, like the royal
postal service that preceded it, had been run as a money-making venture
for the government. 40 Newspaper publishers and other members of the
institutional press were permitted to pay for the privilege of using the

37 Post Offices of the United States, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1852, at 2. For similar claims about
the importance of the postal service to the diffusion of knowledge in the United States, see JOHN,
supra note 26, at 7-15.

38 An Act to Establish the Post-Office and Post Roads Within the United States, ch. 7, 1 Stat.
232 (1792).

39 See JOHN, supra note 26, at 31.

40 Id. at 25.
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postal service but, except in a very narrow class of cases, they had no
right to do so. 4 1
The Post Office Act changed all that: it granted all newspapers a
right of access to the mails and did so notwithstanding credible fears
that granting the right would produce such high demand for postal services it would overwhelm the system. 42 Not only that, the Act granted
newspapers the right to use the mails at heavily subsidized rates.43 It
also prohibited postal agents from opening or inspecting letters and
other bundles of mail. 4 4 Finally, it granted Congress, rather than the
executive branch, the power to designate new postal routes.4 5 This was
a power that members of Congress, aware of the popularity that the
award of a post office brought with it, exercised with vigor.46
The very significant changes the Post Office Act made to the postal
service had a profound impact on the operation of the public sphere in
the United States. The postal subsidies the Act provided newspapers
significantly lowered the cost of disseminating news and information
through the new, very large republic. By enabling rural newspapers to
compete for readers against newspapers in the denser commercial centers, the Act helped create the vibrant, diverse, and decentralized newspaper public sphere that Alexis de Tocqueville marveled at when he
visited the United States in 1831.47 By granting all newspapers a right
of admission to the mail, the Act also prevented postal agents (many of
whom were also newspaper publishers) from doing what they previously
had almost total authority to do: namely, providing postal service to
their own publications but denying it to their competitors.4 8 By vesting
41 Id. at 31. Publishers were recognized to have a right under the pre-1792 system to transmit
what were known as "exchange papers" free of charge, through the mail. Id. at 32. These were
copies of newspapers that were sent to other publishers, so that they could include the information
contained in them in their own papers. Id. But these exchange papers could be sent only to other
publishers, not to members of the general public. See id. Members of Congress also had a right
(the "franking privilege") to send an unlimited number of items through the mails in order to keep
their constituents informed. Id. at 31. Many used this right to circulate newspapers, as well as
government documents, but the right belonged to the representative, not the newspaper. Id. at

31-32.

Id. at 33.
43 Id. at 38-39.
44 Id. at 42-43.
45 Id. at 44-45.
46 Id. at 49-51. In 179o, there were 75 post offices in the United States, each of which serviced
an average of 43,084 people. Id. at 51 tbl.2.i. By 1840, there were 13,468 post offices, each of which
42

serviced an average of 1,087 people. Id.

47 "There is an astonishing circulation of letters and newspapers among these savage woods," de
Tocqueville wrote in 1831 of the United States. "I do not think that in the most enlightened rural
districts of France there is intellectual movement either so rapid or on such a scale as in this wilderness."

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, JOURNEY TO AMERICA 268 (.P.

Mayer ed., George

Lawrence trans., 1959)(1831-1832).
48 See Anuj C. Desai, The Transformationof Statutes into ConstitutionalLaw: How Early Post
Office Policy Shaped Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 671, 679 (2007).
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letter writers with a right of privacy in their mail, the Act made it harder
for the government to surveil and censor dissident speech.4 9 Finally, by
transferring the power to designate postal routes to Congress, the law
enabled the dramatic expansion in the size of the postal service that
resulted by the mid-nineteenth century in a web of postal routes across
the United States that was denser than any that existed in Europe at the
time, and far denser than what existed in Canada.5 0
Supporters justified the changes that the Post Office Act made to
federal postal policy by arguing that they were necessary to create the
rich information environment that a democratic society required.
Congressman Elbridge Gerry argued, for example, that "[h]owever
firmly liberty may be established in any country, it cannot long subsist
if the channels of information be stopped."5 1 Therefore, Gerry argued:
[T]he House ought to adopt measures by which the information, contained
in any one paper within the United States, might immediately spread from
one extremity of the continent to the other; thus the whole body of the citizens will be enabled to see and guard against any evil that may threaten
5 2
them.

The prominent politician and scientist Benjamin Rush similarly argued that, in order to prevent the new republic from losing its liberty,
the government should ensure that "citizens . . . [have] means of acting
in concert with each other," and more specifically should "convey newspapers free of all charge for postage"5 3 by enacting something like the
Post Office Act. Newspapers, Rush added, "are not only the vehicles of
knowledge and intelligence, but the centinels of the liberties of our country." 5 4 It was the government's duty, he argued, to ensure that they circulated widely.5 5
Supporters made, in other words, essentially the same argument to
justify the Act as the one that was made just a few years earlier to justify
the ratification of the First Amendment, and that was made a few years
before that to justify the inclusion of free expression guarantees in the
state constitutions. In all these contexts, the claim was that legal protection for the press - the "centinels" or "bulwarks" of liberty - was
necessary to check the despotic tendencies of government and to guarantee "the security of freedom in a State."5 6

49 See JOHN, supra note 26, at 42-44.
5 See id. at 5, 52-53.
51 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 289 (1791).

52 Id.
Benjamin Rush, Address to the People of the United States 3 (Jan. 1787), https://
archive.csac.history.wisc.edu/Benj aminRush.pdf [https://perma.cc/D73E-8TJN].
54 Id.
55 See id.
56 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XVI ("The liberty of the press is essential to the security
of freedom in a State; it ought not therefore, to be restrained in this Commonwealth."); see also

53
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Despite the marked similarities in the arguments made to justify the
laws, however, almost no one during three years of legislative debate
even hinted at the possibility that the changes the Post Office Act made
to federal postal policy were required by the First Amendment.57 That
no one did so may reflect Congress members' assumption that the baldly
negative language of the First Amendment prohibits government action
but does not require it. And the Post Office Act, and subsequent postal
legislation, required a great deal of action. The historian Richard John
reports that by 1831 the postal system employed over three-quartersof
the entire federal civilian workforce and had a larger personnel roster
than the federal army did.58 Creating a democratic public sphere turned
out to require a great deal of work.
In later decades also, virtually no one argued that the system of
postal subsidies that the Post Office Act helped create, or the dense web
of postal routes it authorized, was required by the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech and press. And although abolitionists
and others argued that the right of admission to the mails that the Post
Office Act granted newspapers was constitutionally required, the Court
unequivocally rejected this argument when it first confronted it in
1877.59 Even in the twentieth century, although the Court made clear
that there were constitutional limits on the government's power to exclude speech from the mails, it continued to interpret the First
Amendment to grant Congress significant power to decide for itself what
kinds of material could be transmitted in the federal mail and at what
kinds of rates.6 0
David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 490-91 (1983) (discussing the idea of the press as "bulwark[s] of liberty," id. at 491, and noting that "[t]hroughout the formative period, the focus of discussion was on the role of the press in relation to the government.
The [central idea] ... was that freedom of the press was a necessary concomitant of selfgovernment," id. at 490-91).

57 One member of Congress did suggest that if Congress were to remove the traditional franking
privileges from the postal bill (which it did not), the result "would be [to] level[] a deadly stroke at
the liberty of the press," but it is unclear whether this was meant as a constitutional argument. 3
ANNALS OF CONG. 252 (1791). In any event, he was the only member of Congress I have found
who explicitly invoked the idea of freedom of press to argue in favor of the postal subsidies.
58 JOHN, supra note 26, at 3-4.
59 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733-37 (1877) (holding that Congress could exclude from the
mail "obscene, lewd, or lascivious book[s], pamphletl[s], picture[s] . .. or any article or thing designed or intended for the prevention of conception or procuring of abortion, [or] any article or thing
intended or adapted for any indecent or immoral use," id. at 736, so long as it did not "prevent the
transportation in other ways, as merchandise, of matter which it excludes from the mails," id. at
735); see Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech,
Press, and Petition in '835-37, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 785, 826-36 (1995) (discussing the claim made
by abolitionists that a proposed federal bill to exclude antislavery materials from the mail would
violate the First Amendment).
60 See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 127 n.5 (1981)
("The Government might ... decline altogether to distribute newspapers; or it might decline to
carry any at less than the cost of service; and it would not thereby abridge the freedom of the press,
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The broad discretion that the First Amendment gives Congress to
provide or not to provide postal subsidies as it chooses means that it
would be wrong to think of the Post Office Act and the many postal
laws that followed it as contributors to a First Amendment tradition of
free speech law, or to think of the postal service that these laws created
as a kind of "First Amendment institution" - as some have argued we
should. 6 1 Instead, the Post Office Act represents an archetypal example
of a non-First Amendment free speech law, and the postal service it
helped create represents, by implication, an important non-First
Amendment free speech institution. The little postal vans that circulate
around our cities and towns make visible the significant amount of labor
the government expends to promote free speech values voluntarily, not
because it is required to do so by the First Amendment.
This fact is important to recognize. Doing otherwise risks obscuring
the extent to which the survival of this important speech-promoting institution depends ultimately on democratic politics, not legal principles.6 2 It also obscures the markedly different conceptions of freedom
of speech that undergird federal postal policy and the First Amendment
cases.
In his history of communications policy in the United States,
Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool interprets the Post Office Act as evidence
that the "twentieth century notion that the proper relation between government and the press is one of arm's-length adversaries [had] no roots
in the thinking of the founding fathers." 63 "Their belief in the importance of the press," de Sola Pool argues, "not only led them to insist
that Congress pass no law 'abridging the freedom of . .. the press' but
also persuaded them to subsidize that press." 6 4
This argument isn't entirely correct. For one thing, the Congress
that enacted the Post Office Act didn't choose to subsidize the press
itself. Instead, it established a system of cross-subsidies, whereby letter

since to all papers other means of transportation would be left open." (quoting United States ex rel.
Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ'g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 431 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 154-56 (1946) (recognizing that Congress has the
power "to encourage the distribution of periodicals which disseminate[] 'information of a public
character' or which [are] devoted to 'literature, the sciences, arts, or some special industry,"' id. at
154 (quoting Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 305 (1913)), but noting that "grave constitutional questions are immediately raised once it is said that the use of the mails is a privilege which
may be extended or withheld on any grounds whatsoever," id. at 156).
61 Desai, supra note 48, at 673.
62 The political nature of the postal service is in fact something that has become vividly evident
last year, but not because of the work of free speech scholars. See Nicholas Fandos & Reid J.
Epstein, A Fight over the Future of the Mail Breaks Down Along Familiar Lines, N.Y.
TIMES

(May

27,

2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/lo/us/politics/postal-service-trump-

coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/CNE3-FHQH].
63 DE SOLA POOL, supra note 26, at 78.
64 Id.
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writers (usually merchants) paid higher postage prices so that newspaper
publishers didn't have to.65 And the Second Congress did think that
the press and the government might sometimes be arms-length adversaries. This is why it guaranteed to all newspapers, not just some, a
right of admission to the mail. Its members feared that without such a
policy, the government would use access to the mails as a carrot to reward friendly newspapers and as a stick to punish unfriendly newspapers - that it would set up what Elbridge Gerry described as a "court
press and a court gazette." 66
But de Sola Pool is completely correct that the Post Office Act
demonstrates a remarkably different understanding of the government's
role in the marketplace of ideas than the very restricted role the modern
First Amendment cases envisage for it. In his concurring opinion in
CBS v. Democratic National Committee,67 in 1973, Justice Douglas argued that the First Amendment required the government to adopt a
"laissez-faire regime" of media regulation. 68 The "one hard and fast
principle" of the "old-fashioned First Amendment," Justice Douglas insisted, 69 is "that Government shall keep its hands off the press." 70 The
Court effectively adopted this view of the First Amendment the following year, when it held in Miami Herald PublishingCo. v. Tornillo7 1 that
the freedom of press guaranteed by the First Amendment permitted no
regulatory interference whatsoever with the "editorial control and judgment" of newspaper editors. 2
The Post Office Act reflects, in contrast, a very non-laissez-faire approach to the problem of media regulation. While the Act did not attempt to directly interfere with the editorial judgment of members of
the press, it did strongly incentivize certain kinds of editorial choices
(those that resulted in the production of newspapers) and disincentivize
others (those that resulted in the production of magazines, or pamphlets,
or books). 3 The Act also treated some speakers (magazine and book

65 JOHN, supra note 26, at 31, 38-39.
66 Id. at 34.

67 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
68 Id. at 161 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
69 Id. at 16o.
70 Id. at 16o-6i.
71 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
72 Id. at 258.
73 These incentives had a measurable impact on the editorial choices that publishers made. John
notes, for example, that because only newspapers were guaranteed admission to the mails, abolitionist groups took great care when sending antislavery materials to the South to make sure that
their mailings either took the form of newspapers or adopted the "magazine format that . . . postal
officers routinely admitted into the mail." JOHN, supra note 26, at 262. And because books were
excluded from the mails until '851, "enterprising printers of all kinds quickly adapted their publications to a newspaper format, leading in short order to the publication of religious newspapers,
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publishers) worse than it treated others (newspaper publishers) and did
so because members of Congress believed that the information that
newspapers conveyed was more politically valuable than the information that magazines and books conveyed. 4
In the First Amendment cases, this kind of content discrimination is
generally considered anathema to freedom of speech. The Court has
insisted that when the government treats some speakers worse than others because of the viewpoint they express or the subject matter they
address it harms the "equality of status in the field of ideas" that the
First Amendment guarantees to all speakers. 5
But it was by means of content distinctions - or at least, it was by
means of genre distinctions that were closely correlated to differences in
content that Congress attempted in 1792 to promote freedom of
speech. 6 Although members of Congress clearly worried about the possibility that postal agents might make viewpoint-based distinctions
when determining access to the mail, no one raised any concern about
the genre-based distinctions that were written into the postal laws, even
though these reflected a set of widely shared views about both the nature
and the relative value of the content of different kinds of publications."
To the contrary: given a scarcity of resources, and a cash-strapped state,
Congress appears to have believed that the only way to ensure a sufficient diffusion of political information to sustain a democratic system of
government was to grant newspaper publishers privileges that other
speakers did not receive - privileges that other speakers were in fact
required to subsidize.7 8
agricultural newspapers, reform newspapers, and even literary newspapers that reprinted entire

novels for transmission at the low newspaper rate." Id. at 39.
74 See Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Press, Post Office, and Flow of News in the Early Republic,
3 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 255, 267-68 (1983) [hereinafter Kielbowicz, Early Republic]; Richard
Kielbowicz, Mere Merchandise or Vessels of Culture?:Books in the Mail, 1792-1942, 82 PAPERS
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SOC'Y. AM. 169, 176 (1988); Desai, supra note 48, at 694 n.104 ("The drafters

of the 1792 Act . . . fully understood that they were writing into law what was, in effect, a contentbased distinction. They recognized that newspapers printed information about public affairs,
whether as propaganda for the government or attacks on it, and that letter-writers - generally
speaking - did not. . . . One might even see the postal subsidies for newspapers as the first example
of Congress favoring political over commercial speech, since most letter-writers were merchants
sending market information."); JOHN, supra note 26, at 39-40 (describing system of cross-subsidies
between letter-writers and newspapers).
75 Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948)).

76 In later years, the content distinctions were made explicit. For example, the 1825 postal law
required that newspapers provide "an account of political or other occurrences" in order to receive
the subsidized postal rates.

U.S. POSTAL SERV., POSTAL LAWS & REGULATIONS OF THE

UNITED STATES: 1825, at 37 (1825).
77 See Desai, supra note 48, at 693-95.

78 Worries about overburdening the post office pervaded the legislative debates about the Post
Office Act, yet no one suggested that the federal government should expend more resources to prop
the post office up. One can understand why not. The new federal government had very little
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This belief wasn't entirely disinterested. Congressmen from both
parties embraced newspaper privileges not only because they believed
newspapers conveyed information that was crucial to the preservation
of democratic liberty in the United States, but also because they believed
that newspapers, by reporting on their activities and reprinting their
speeches, shored up their political power.79 Ideological commitments
overlapped with more self-interested concerns and motivations.
The result was nevertheless a body of law that furthered many of
the same values as the First Amendment was intended to, but which
did so by embracing a much more interventionist, even redistributive,
concept of the government's role in the speech marketplace than the
First Amendment cases assume, and typically permit.80 It is a view of
democratic liberty, and of freedom of speech, that continues to inform
federal postal policy to this day.8 1
B.

Common Carrierand Quasi-Common CarrierLaws

A similar story can be told about the significant body of common
carrier and quasi-common carrier law that limits the ability of many of
the private media companies that disseminate information to the public
in the United States to control the content of the information that they
disseminate, or to determine the rates they charge consumers for using
their communication networks to speak. These laws also protect free
speech values and interests, but do so by non-First Amendment means.
Consider, for example, one of the more important current common
carrier laws, § 202 of the Communications Act of 1934,82 which prohibits telephone and telegraph companies, and all other communications
companies that are defined as common carriers under federal law, 8

money and considerable debt. In early 1792, it also staved off a potentially serious financial crisis.
See generally Richard Sylla, Robert E. Wright & David J. Cowen, Alexander Hamilton, Central
Banker: CrisisManagement During the U.S. FinancialPanic of 1792, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 61 (2009).
Under these conditions, even the very ambitious members of the Second Congress appear not to
have taken seriously the idea that vindicating democratic values might require deficit spending on
the post.
79 See Kielbowicz, Early Republic, supra note 74, at 255.
80 JOHN, supra note 26, at 39-40 ("To reduce the cost of securing political information for
citizen-farmers, many of whom lived in the South and West, Congress increased the cost of doing
business for merchants, most of whom lived in the North and East. In the broadest sense, then,
this policy was not distributive, but regulatory or, more precisely, redistributive.").
81 The history recounted above explains, for example, why newspapers and magazines continue
to pay lower postage rates than letter-writers and why nonprofit publications receive lower postage
rates still.
See Classes of Mail, U.S. POSTAL SERV., https://pe.usps.com/BusinessMailioi/
Index?ViewName=ClassesOfMail [https://perma.cc/NKP4-HP8S]; Special Prices for Nonprofit
Mailers, U.S. POSTAL SERV.,
https://pe.usps.com/BusinessMailioi/Index?ViewName=
NonprofitPrices [https://perma. cc/gYGR-Q7UP].
82 Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1Q64 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
83 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(11).
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from "mak[ing] any unjust or unreasonable discrimination" in the facilities they provide or the rates they charge consumers, and from "subject[ing] any particular person, class of persons, or locality to any undue
or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage."8 4 The law, which has been
interpreted to prevent common carriers from discriminating against consumers because of the content of their speech, their identity, or any other
irrelevant characteristic, clearly protects a number of interests that the
First Amendment also protects. 5 By prohibiting telephone companies
like AT&T from denying service to customers because they dislike what
the customers say or who they are, common carrier laws act, just as the
First Amendment does, as a shield under which "many types of life,
character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed"
by external repression. 6 By preventing common carriers from engaging
in discriminatory pricing, the laws safeguard "the free communication
of views" that the First Amendment also safeguards." And by ensuring
that the rates companies charge are not unreasonably high, the laws help
ensure that the public has access to a wide "dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources," just as the First Amendment
does."
The same is true of the many quasi-common carrier laws that impose somewhat narrower speech-facilitating obligations on media companies that are not considered common carriers under federal or state
law.89 A good example of a quasi-common carrier law is § 315 of the
Communications Act 90 and its regulatory extension in the Code of
Federal Regulations.9 1 These laws require radio and television broad-

Id. § 202(a).
85 What counts as "unreasonable discrimination" is not always clear. The courts have interpreted the broad language of the statute to vest the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
with significant discretion to decide. Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3 d 11g5, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
("The generality of these terms - unfair, undue, unreasonable, unjust - opens a rather large area
for the free play of agency discretion .... "). There is no question, however, that content-based
discrimination is generally considered unreasonable, as are distinctions based on race or gender.
See Nat'l Ass'n of Regul. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 6oi, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("An examination of the common law reveals that the primary sine qua non of common carrier status is a quasipublic character, which arises out of the undertaking 'to carry for all people indifferently ....
(omission in original) (quoting Semon v. Royal Indem. Co., 279 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. i96o))).
86 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
87 See id. at 308.
88 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
89 Brent Skorup and Joseph Kane have usefully defined a quasi-common carrier as a carrier,
such as a cable television company, that "may control and curate some content on its network but
is prohibited from exercising total control over content." Brent Skorup & Joseph Kane, The FCC
and Quasi-Common Carriage:A Case Study of Agency Survival, i8 MJNN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 631,
649-50 (2017).
90 47 U.S.C. § 315.
91 47 C.F.R. § 76.205 (2019).
'

84
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casters, and by extension cable television companies, that permit candidates for public office to use a broadcast station to "afford equal
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of
such broadcasting station." 9 2 They also prohibit these companies from
censoring the candidate speech that they air. 93 And they require radio
and television stations to charge candidates the same rates as are
charged for comparable use of that airtime, and, close to elections, the
lowest rate they charge anyone else for that time. 94 By preventing radio
and television companies from refusing to provide airtime to political
candidates they dislike and from censoring their speech, these laws help
to ensure a public sphere that is "uninhibited, robust, and wideopen"95 - one in which all speakers (at least all speakers who happen
to be legally qualified candidates for public office) have an opportunity
to persuade others of the merits of their views. 96
Although these laws protect many of the same interests that the First
Amendment protects, the Court has never interpreted the First
Amendment to require their enactment.
Nor has it interpreted the
First Amendment to itself impose nondiscrimination duties on media
companies. Under current state action rules such a conclusion would
be unimaginable, but in the 1940s and 1950s it was entirely plausible,
given the very significant public benefits the government provided (and
continues to provide) to many of the companies regulated by these
laws.97 In its Fourteenth Amendment cases during this period, the
Court repeatedly held that when the government uses its "power, property and prestige" 98 to shore up the authority or enable the actions of
private actors (restaurants, for example, or political parties, or property
owners), the Equal Protection Clause prevents those private actors from
acting in a way that violates constitutional equality norms, or at least,
prevents the government from enabling them to do so. 99 But the Court
never found the same to be true of the media companies that used the

&

92 47 U.S.C. § 315(a); see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.205(a).
93 47 U.S.C. § 315(a); 47 C.F.R. § 76.205(a).
94 47 U.S.C. § 3 15(b); 47 C.F.R. § 7 6.205(b).
95 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
96 That the equal opportunities requirement serves these goals was recognized by the Court in
Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union v. WDAY Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 529-30 (1959).
97 For example, the federal government allows the radio broadcasters subject to § 315 to use the
public airwaves free of charge. R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L.
ECON. 1, 22-24 (1959) (noting the "extraordinary gain accruing to radio and television station operators as a result of the present system of allocating frequencies," id. at 23). Similarly, telegraph
and telephone companies have traditionally received a variety of public benefits - such as the right
to construct their lines on public roads, as well as the right of eminent domain. See Herbert H.
Kellogg, Telephone Law, 4 YALE L.J. 223, 224-25 (1894).
98 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
99 Id. at 724-25; see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, 664-66 (1944).
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public airwaves, or that built their communication networks on public
land.10 0 This may be because it did not need to. Already by that period,
a rich body of common carrier and quasi-common carrier law prevented
many of these companies from engaging in viewpoint discrimination or
otherwise threatening the interests that the First Amendment protects.
No comparable law existed to vindicate the equal protection rights at
stake in the Court's Fourteenth Amendment cases.
Whatever the reason, the Court's refusal to find that nondiscrimination duties imposed on private media companies by common carrier and
quasi-common carrier laws are constitutionally required means that
Professor Tim Wu is completely correct when he argues that laws like
§ 202 and § 315 contribute to a "second free speech tradition" that is
entirely distinct from the First Amendment free speech tradition. 101
This is the case even if, as this Article makes clear, the second free speech
tradition consists of a lot more than just the media laws that are the
focus of Wu's concern.
Nevertheless, like the postal laws discussed in the previous section,
the many state and federal laws that impose common carrier or quasicommon carrier duties on media companies protect important First
Amendment interests not because they are constitutionally required but
because the legislators that enacted them, or the regulators that promulgated them, came to believe (often in response to significant pressure
from labor unions, civil society groups, and others) that these laws were
necessary to safeguard the democratic nature of the government and the
vitality of the press. Indeed, although Wu suggests that the communications common carrier laws were initially motivated solely by legislators' concern with the commercial or economic harms that powerful
monopolies in the communications business could create, in fact an important motivation behind many of these laws, including the early ones,

100 The closest the Court ever came to suggesting the possibility that common carrier or quasicommon carrier laws might be constitutionally required was its assertion, in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), that the First Amendment right of the radio-listening public to
access "an uninhibited marketplace of ideas" that was not "monopoliz[ed] ... [either] by the
Government itself or [by] a private licensee" could "not constitutionally be abridged either by
Congress or by the [FCC]," the agency that enforced the Communications Act. Id. at 390. The
language here does suggest that were Congress or the FCC to do nothing to prevent the monopolization of the marketplace of ideas by a private radio broadcaster, the First Amendment might be
offended. But the Court never held as much explicitly. In any event, Red Lion applied only to
radio and television broadcasters, not to the broad sweep of media companies that are today, or
were at the time, subject to common carrier and quasi-common carrier obligations. See id. at
386-87 (distinguishing the First Amendment rights of radio broadcasters from those of newspapers
and other members of the press).
101 Wu, supra note 12, at 2.
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was the belief that they were necessary to ensure the unconstrained public sphere that a democratic society requires.1 0 2
We can see this when we look at the legislative debates surrounding
the very first communications common carrier laws ever enacted in the
United States. These laws required the telegraph companies that played
such an important role in the dissemination of information in the second
half of the nineteenth century to "operate their respective telegraph lines
as to afford equal facilities to all, without discrimination in favor of or
against any person, company, or corporation whatever."1 0 3 Dozens of
states enacted statutes of this sort between 1848 and the early twentieth
century, as did the federal government. 10 4 Beginning in the late nineteenth century, a number of states also required the newsgathering organizations that gathered and disseminated news on the telegraph wires
to provide their services "to all newspapers, persons, companies or corporations . . . at uniform rates and without discrimination."10 5
These early common carrier laws were a response to the largely unprecedented problems created in the mid-nineteenth century by the private commercialization of the new technology of the electric telegraph.
When it was invented in 1838, the telegraph was hailed as a marvelously
democratizing device because of its ability to "diffuse with the speed of
thought, a knowledge of all that is occurring throughout the land." 1 0 6
But because of the power it placed in the hands of whomever operated
it, it was widely assumed that the telegraph both would, and should,

102 Id. at 4 (arguing that the "primary interest" in early federal regulation of communications
common carriers "was commercial or economic" but that "whatever the original intent of the law,
when applied to an industry that moves information, the common carriage rule automatically became a law affecting speech").
103 Telegraph Lines Act, Act of Aug. 7, 1888, 25 Stat. 382, 383.
104 The earliest such law was enacted in New York in 1848 and required all telegraph companies
that operated in the state to "receive despatches [sic] from and for . . . any individual, and on payment of their usual charges . . . to transmit the same with impartiality and good faith . . . in the
order in which they are received .... " Act of April 12, 1848, ch. 265, §§ 11-12, 1848 N.Y. Laws
392, 395 (providing for the incorporation and regulation of telegraph companies). But many states
enacted similar laws.
See William Jones, The Common Carrier Concept as Applied to
Telecommunications: A HistoricalPerspective, CYBERTELECOM (1980), http://www.cybertelecom.
org/notes/jones.htm [https://perma.cc/5AVH-CBQD]. The federal laws included the Act of June 16,
i86o, Pub. L. No. 36-137, 12 Stat. 41 (i86o) (facilitating communication between the Atlantic and
Pacific states by electric telegraph); Act of July 2, 1864, Pub. L. No. 38-216, 13 Stat. 357 (1864)
(amending an Act to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri River
to the Pacific Ocean); and the Telegraph Lines Act.
105 State Statutes Affecting the Associated Press, in LAW OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS 503

(1914). The language comes from the 1913 Arkansas statute, but similar laws were enacted in
Nebraska, Kentucky, Mississippi, Kansas, and Utah. Id. at 484-90, 504 (describing the Arkansas,
Nebraska, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Kansas laws); see also UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-2-1 to
73-2-7 (1933).
106 DAVID HOCHFELDER, THE TELEGRAPH IN AMERICA, 1832-1920, at 176 (2013) (quoting

Samuel Morse).
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remain exclusively under government control. 107 This was not to be,
however: after an early experiment at a government-run telegraph
failed, the federal government disclaimed any interest in developing a
government-run or "postal" telegraph. 108
The specter of an entirely privately run telegraph industry raised
significant concern about the possibility that the private entities that
controlled this amazing new technology would use that power to manipulate the flow of information to the public when doing so served their
economic or political self-interest. These concerns only intensified when
the initially competitive telegraph market consolidated under the control
of the Western Union Telegraph Company, and Western Union in turn
forged a close alliance with the Associated Press (AP), the most powerful
newsgathering organization in the country.10 9
The behavior of these two industrial titans appeared to bear out all
the fears that led so many people to earlier advocate for a governmentrun telegraph. It came to light, for example, that as part of its alliance
with Western Union, the AP required newspapers that wished to receive
its valuable news digests to contractually agree to refrain from publishing any newspaper articles that expressed support for Western Union's
competitors or that criticized Western Union itself. 110 There were reports that Western Union refused to carry telegraph messages from

107 The Whig Party candidate for president, Henry Clay, argued in 1844 that the telegraph "ought
to be exclusively under the control of government" because if "private individuals" were to control
it, "they will be able to monopolize intelligence and to perform the greatest operations in commerce
and other departments of business." JOHN, supra note 26, at 87. Views of this sort were expressed
by a wide variety of people during this period. Id. at 87-88. Even the inventor of the new technology, Samuel Morse, argued that the federal government should operate his invention, although
this may have been because he wanted to receive government funds to finance its construction (as
he did). See id.
108 HOCHFELDER, supra note 1o6, at 33 ("Despite [Samuel] Morse's and [Postmaster General]
Johnson's appeals, the federal government abandoned the telegraph to capitalists.").
109 See PAUL STARR, CREATION OF THE MEDIA 166 (2004) ("The American [telegraph] industry . . . first splintered into a large number of firms - more than fifty different companies, as of
1851 - and then underwent consolidation, ultimately leaving a single corporation, Western Union,
in control."). By 1876, Western Union was the largest corporation in the United States and transmitted something like go% of the telegraphs sent in the United States. Menahem Blondheim,
Rehearsal for Media Regulation: Congress Versus the Telegraph-News Monopoly, 1866-1900, 56
FED. COMMC'NS L.J. 299, 305 (2004). By the end of the century, the AP had achieved a similar
dominance of the news-gathering industry. Thomas W. Brown, A Newspaper Trust, 31 AM. L. REV.
569, 569-70 (1897) (noting that after vanquishing its chief rival, the United Press, the "Associated
Press [had] acquire[d] a practical monopoly of the business of collecting and disseminating, through
its members, the news of the day" and that, although "under certain circumstances, a member may
leave the association . . . this liberty is something like that of a passenger to leave a vessel in midocean, by jumping overboard").
110 These provisions were enforced. In one case, the AP stopped supplying news to a newspaper,
the Omaha Republican, after it called Western Union a "'grievous,' 'onerous,' and 'gigantic' 'monopoly' in one of its editorials." HOCHFELDER, supra note o6, at 44; see also Blondheim, supra
note 109, at 315.
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newspapers that used newsgathering organizations that competed with
the AP, or that when it did, it charged them exorbitant rates.11 1 It was
also widely believed that Western Union's directors delayed the transmission of telegrams containing financial information so that they could
take advantage of that information before the rest of the market. 1 1 2
Unions meanwhile complained that Western Union delayed the transmission of strike-related telegraphs in order to "demoraliz[e] the strike
and frustrat[e] the plans and confus[e] the orders of the leaders."1 1 3 And
both Western Union and the AP were accused of influencing the reporting of political elections in an effort to promote the election of candidates
their directors favored. 11 4
It was in order to protect the independence of the newspaper press,
and to prevent companies like Western Union and the AP from manipulating the flow of information to the public that lawmakers in dozens
of states imposed on telegraph companies and telegraph newsgathering
associations nondiscrimination duties similar to those the postal laws
imposed on the post office.
As the House of Representatives
Appropriation Committee put it in 1872, to explain why it was necessary
to impose these kinds of duties on telegraph companies like Western
Union:
In this country, the perpetuation of the Government must have its ultimate
guarantee in the intelligence of the people. No agency is so potent in the
dissemination of intelligence as the press, and to the daily press the telegraph
is far more essential that the post. Yet, the telegraph in the United States,
[is] owned and controlled . . . by private corporations . . . [who] have so
hedged themselves in by alliances with press associations that no new or
projected journal can have the use of the telegraph at rates not absolutely
ruinous, and many journals, long established and receiving reports, are in
the absolute power of the telegraph companies. . . . No government, autocratic or democratic, would dare authorize such discriminating privileges in
the administration of its postal facilities. And yet, the telegraph sustains
practically the same relation to the masses of the people that the post sustains. The conveniences and the exigencies of Social Affairs, of Commerce,
of Trade, of Finance, of Government, have become as dependent on the
111 S. REP. NO. 43-242, at 3 (1874).
112 HOCHFELDER, supra note 1o6, at 44-45 ("Although there is no hard evidence that any officers or directors of Western Union manipulated the country's financial news, this suspicion had
widespread currency.... Just after the turn of the century, muckraker Gustavus Myers similarly
charged that [Jay] Gould [Western Union's president from 1881] had routinely used his control over
Western Union's wires to manipulate the stock market.").
113 Monster Petition:Knights of Labor Moving for a Postal Telegraph, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1888.
114 In 1884, for example, the New York Times published a full-page article accusing the AP of
trying to influence the extremely close presidential election between James G. Blaine and Grover
Cleveland by misreporting, and delaying the transmission of, election returns. The Blaine Men
Bluffing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1884, at 5. Similar accusations were made about Western Union's
role in the presidential contest, eight years earlier, between Rutherford B. Hayes and Samuel J.
Tilden. HOCHFELDER, supra note 1o6, at 44.
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telegraph as the mails and the same general laws of equality of privileges
which have been wisely extended over the latter should, at the earliest possible day, be extended over the former.1 15

The Committee's argument, in other words, was that the same nondiscrimination duties that applied to the postal workers that controlled
the important government-operated communication networks not only
could be but had to be imposed on the private companies that controlled
the most important communication networks of the day; that doing so
was necessary to ensure the fundamentally democratic character of the
mass public sphere, as well as the continuing independence of the newspaper press.
The Illinois Supreme Court made a similar argument in 1900 to explain why, even in a state like Illinois, which did not impose common
carrier duties on newsgathering organizations like the AP, the common
law required the imposition of such duties. "The Associated Press, from
the time of its organization and establishment in business, sold its news
reports to various newspapers," the court wrote, "and the publication of
that news became of vast importance to the public, so that public interest is attached to the dissemination of that news."1 16 This meant, the
court held, that "all newspaper publishers desiring to purchase [AP]
news for publication are entitled to . . . without discrimination against
To hold otherwise, the court noted, would enable the AP to
them." 1
"create a monopoly in its . . . favor" that would allow the corporation to
"designate the character of the news that should be published" and
would mean that "whether true or false, there could be no check on [its
power] by publishing news from other sources.""
Such a result, the
court concluded, "could prejudice the interests of the public . . . and
[would be] hostile to public interests." 1 9
Although neither the House Appropriations Committee nor the
Illinois Supreme Court used the constitutional language of freedom of
speech, it is clear from their arguments that what motivated their actions was the fear that unconstrained private control of the telegraphs
would threaten the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public debate
on public matters that the First Amendment also protects. 1 2 0 Nor were
they the only ones to believe that constraints had to be imposed on the
power of telegraph and newsgathering associations in order to preserve
freedom of speech and press in the mass public sphere.

115 H.R. REP. No. 42-6, at 7-8 (1872).
116 Inter-Ocean Publ'g Co. v. Associated Press, 56 N.E. 822, 825 (Ill. 1900).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 826.
119

Id.

120 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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Arguments of this sort pervaded the intense debates about telegraph
regulation that took place throughout the country during this period. 1 2 1
Although there was disagreement about the solution to the problem
some lawmakers argued, for example, that Congress should go further
than it did and entirely wrest control of the telegraph lines from the
private companies, whereas others vigorously disagreed - there was
broad consensus in Congress, as well as in many of the state legislatures,
that something had to be done to prevent the companies that controlled
the telegraph wires from acting as "master[s] of the press" and "giv[ing]
to the news of the day such a color as [it] chose . . . thus fatally pollut[ing] the very fountain of public opinion." 1 2 2 The result was the creation, by the end of the nineteenth century, of a rich body of state and
federal common carrier law that not only promoted free speech values
but did so quite intentionally in the belief that this kind of regulation
was crucial to the preservation of the democratic character of the mass
public sphere.
This body of free speech law would only continue to grow in the
twentieth century, in large part because the problems it addressed did
so as well. Consider, for example, the regulation of the radio. When
radio broadcasting first emerged in the 1920s, it was celebrated, just as
the telegraph had been, as a "powerful agent of democracy" because of
its ability to erase social distinctions and create translocal "communit[ies] of interest."1 2 3 But, just as occurred with the telegraph, control
over the new technology quickly consolidated. By 1931, two national
radio networks the National Broadcasting Corporation and the
dominated the market. 124
Columbia Broadcasting System Meanwhile, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), which represented the 500 largest radio broadcasters in the United States, encouraged its members to abide by often highly repressive speech policies.
For example, in 1939, the NAB decreed that its members should not sell
airtime to labor unions (although they could give it away) because of the

121 Blondheim, supra note 1o9, at 306-07 ("In the period between 1866 and 19go, all Congresses
but one considered plans to regulate Western Union. This intensive involvement yielded no less
than ninety-six bills and resolutions brought before Congress that addressed the problem of Western
Union.... The issue of telegraph regulation was very prominent in the public sphere as well. It
was debated extensively in the press and even constituted a favorite topic for college exercises in
rhetoric and debating.").
122 S. REP. NO. 42-242, at 5 (1872) (citations omitted). For a general discussion of the debates see
Blondheim, supra note '09; David Hochfelder, A Comparison of the Postal Telegraph Movement in
Great Britain and the United States, 1866-1900, 1 ENTER. & SOC'Y 739, 748-55 (2000).
123 HADLEY CANTRIL & GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RADIO
20 (1935)
124 ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND DEMOCRACY:
THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING 1928-1935, at 29 (1993).
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"controversial" nature of their views. 12 5 The result, labor groups asserted, was a virtual blackout of union voices from the air. 1 2 6
These developments led the ACLU and other civil-society groups to
express strong concern about the problem of private censorship on the
airwaves, and led Congress to impose a variety of speech-facilitating
and nondiscrimination duties on broadcasters. 127 When it enacted the
Radio Act of 192'7,128 Congress chose not to classify radio broadcasters
as common carriers because it feared that, were it to do so, stations
would no longer be able to provide the programming their listeners
wanted to hear. 12 9 But Congress did impose on broadcasters the "equal
opportunities" and no censorship requirements that would later be encoded in § 315 of the Communications Act.1 3 0 It did so because its
members feared that, absent these requirements, radio broadcasters
would possess too much power to shape democratic politics by "permitting one party or one candidate . . . to employ [their] service[s] and refusing to accord the same right to the opposing side." 13 1
Some members of Congress argued that, given the tremendous power
that the "few men" who controlled the "great publicity vehicle" of the
radio possessed, the federal government should impose on license holders far broader nondiscrimination duties than simply the duty to afford
equal opportunities to opposing political candidates. 132 And in fact, in

125 ELIZABETH FONES-WOLF, WAVES OF OPPOSITION: LABOR AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
A DEMOCRATIC RADIO 63 (2006).

Even prior to the adoption of the NAB code, labor groups
"struggled for access to the radios" and the big networks already had policies that prohibited the
sale of airtime to unions. Id. "When [stations] did sell time to labor, most stations demanded that
the speakers provide advance scripts. When speakers veered from their scripts, the stations turned
their microphones off." Samantha Barbas, Creatingthe Public Forum, 44 AKRON L. REV. 809, 834
(2011).

126 FONES-WOLF, supra note 125, at 64.
127 In 1935, for example, the ACLU's newly formed Radio Committee declared that private censorship was the greatest threat to "free speech on the radio," although not without ambivalence.
Barbas, supra note 125, at 833. The Radio Committee noted in the 1935 report that it was not
"without wistful glances in other directions" that it had decided to "abandon the notion that censorship means exclusively government censorship." Id.
128 Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
129 Id. An early version of the Act prohibited holders of radio broadcast licenses from making
any "discrimination as to the use of [their] broadcasting station" for "the discussion of any question
affecting the public" and provided furthermore that "with respect to said matters the licensee shall
be deemed a common carrier in interstate commerce." 67 CONG. REC. 12,503 (1926). It was removed from the bill, however, after a member of Congress objected that "[i]f they [we]re made
common carriers,"radio stations would be unable "to give a regular entertainment at regular hours"
and "there would be no inducement on the part of the public to listen in." Id. at 12,504 (1926)
(statement of Sen. Broussard).
130 47 U.S.C. § 315(a); see also Radio Act § i8.
131 Roscoe L. Barrow, The Equal Opportunitiesand Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting:Pillars
in the Forum of Democracy, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 447, 452 (1968); see also id. at 452-53 (describing
the legislative history of the provision); Primer on Pol. Broad., 100 F.C.C.2d 1476, 1486 (1984).
132 67 CONG. REC. 12,503-04 (1926) (statement of Sen. Howell).
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1932, both houses approved an amendment to the Radio Act that would
have required broadcasters to allow equal opportunity to present both
sides of public questions. 133 President Hoover used a pocket veto to kill
the amendment, however; and when it enacted the Communications Act
of 1934, Congress included the equal-opportunities provision in the
Radio Act without broadening it in any way.134 But Congress also
vested the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the agency
charged with enforcing the Act, with the power to regulate holders of
radio broadcast licenses as the "public interest, convenience, or necessity" required. 1 35
The FCC used this power to impose on radio broadcasters the same
broad nondiscrimination obligations that Congress had tried to add to
the text of the Radio Act in 1932. Specifically, it required radio broadcasters to "devote a reasonable percentage of their broadcast time . . . to
the consideration and discussion of public issues of interest in the community served by the[ir] . . . station" and to "provide the listening public
with a fair and balanced presentation of differing viewpoints on [those]
issues, without regard to the[ir own] particular views." 136 The FCC also
required radio stations that, "during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance, [aired] an attack . . . upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person
or group," to offer the person or group attacked a reasonable opportunity
to respond on air. 13 7 The FCC imposed the same right of reply obligation on radio stations that endorsed or opposed a legally qualified candidate for public office. 138 This complex of rules came to be known as
the fairness doctrine.
To justify its actions, the FCC made the same argument that the
House Appropriations Committee and the Illinois Supreme Court made
to justify the telegraph common carrier rules: namely, that the constraints the fairness doctrine imposed on the freedom of radio broadcasters were necessary to preserve the fundamentally democratic character
of the mass public sphere. This time around, however (perhaps in a sign
of the growing cultural power of the First Amendment), the agency explicitly relied upon the language of freedom of speech to make its argument. In crafting the doctrine, the agency asserted that

133 Steven

J.

Simmons, FairnessDoctrine: The Early History,

29

FED. COMMC'NS BAR J. 207,

235-36 (1976).
134

Id. at 236-38.

135 See Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1242, 1248
(1949).
136 Id. at 1249, 1253.

137 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1969) (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920(a)
(1997)).

138 Id. at 374-75 (quoting 47 C.F.R. @ 73.1930 (1997)).
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[W]e have recognized . . . the paramount right of the public in a free society
to be informed and to have presented to it for acceptance or rejection the
different attitudes and viewpoints concerning these vital and often controversial issues which are held by the various groups which make up the
community. 13 9

"Only where the [broadcaster's] discretion in the choice of the particular
programs to be broadcast over his facilities is exercised so as to afford a
reasonable opportunity for the presentation of all responsible positions
on matters of sufficient importance to be afforded radio time," the FCC
argued, "can radio be maintained as a medium of freedom of speech for
the people as a whole." 1 4 0
Despite the similarities in the arguments made to justify the fairness
doctrine and the telegraph and newsgathering-organization common
carrier laws, the fairness doctrine generated intense and persistent controversy (unlike those earlier laws). This was in part because the fairness doctrine directly regulated the choices private media companies
made about what to include in the news (whereas the earlier laws had
done so only indirectly), and in part because of the breadth and vagueness of the obligations it imposed on radio broadcasters - and later,
television broadcasters and cable television providers as well.141 Critics
argued that, rather than promoting a vigorous and varied debate about
public issues on the radio, the fairness doctrine had a chilling effect on
the willingness of radio and television stations to discuss controversial
issues. 1 4 2 Others, including Justice Douglas, argued that it simply gave
the government too much power over the press. 1 4 3 These criticisms led
the FCC, after more than fifty years of its enforcement, to revoke the
fairness doctrine in part in 1987 and to do so fully in 2000.144

139 Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, 13 F.C.C. at 1249.
140 Id. at 1250.

141 See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Comment, The FairnessDoctrine Today:
A Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151, 152, 155, 157.
Beginning in the late 1940s, the FCC began to apply the fairness doctrine, and the other quasicommon carrier requirements imposed on radio broadcasters by the Communications Act, to television broadcasters. See generally Lance S. Davidson, Extension of the Federal Communications
Commission's Jurisdiction to the Television Networks, 4 J. COMMC'NS & ENT. L. 235 (1981).
Beginning in the late i96os, the FCC extended the fairness doctrine to cable television providers.
It argued that doing so was necessary to prevent its rules from being "grossly circumvented." 34
Fed. Reg. 17,658, 17,658 (Oct. 31, 1969).
142 See, e.g., P.M. Schenkkan, Comment, Power in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Fairness
Doctrine and the First Amendment, 52 TEX. L. REV. 727, 736-38 (1974)143 CBS, Inc. v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 162 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing "the prospect
of putting Government in a position of control over publishers" as "an appalling one, even to the
extent of the Fairness Doctrine").
144 Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules, 65 Fed. Reg.
66,643 (2000) (repealing the right-of-reply obligations). It took thirteen additional years for the FCC
to revoke the right-of-reply rules because of persistent disagreement within the agency about the
merits of doing so. See Commission Proceeding Regarding the Personal Attack and Political
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The revocation of the fairness doctrine did not spell the end of the
law of quasi-common carriage, however, as applied to radio broadcasters or anyone else. The same concerns that prompted its development,
and that motivated Congress to include the "equal opportunities" requirement in § 315 of the Communications Act, also led Congress in
subsequent decades to impose a number of other nondiscrimination and
equal-time obligations on radio and television broadcasters, and other
media companies.
In 1972, for example, Congress amended the
Communications Act to require broadcasters to allow "legally qualified
candidate[s] for Federal elective office" to purchase "reasonable amounts
of [air]time." 14 5 This last requirement, unlike § 315, did not merely prohibit radio and television stations from discriminating in favor of commercial speakers and against political speakers, but granted qualified
federal candidates an affirmative right of access to the airwaves. 146 In
1990, Congress imposed another requirement on television broadcasters:
namely, that they broadcast a certain number of hours of educational
children's programming each week. 14
Congress also imposed quasi-common carrier duties on cable companies. In 1984, for example, it enacted the Cable Communications
Policy Act, which required cable television stations to devote a certain
number of their channels to public, educational, or governmental use, if
required to do so by state or local law. 148 And in 1992, it required cable
television providers to devote an additional number of channels to the
transmission of local broadcast television programming. 149
In all these cases, Congress imposed constraints on the editorial freedom of media companies not despite but because of what its members
understood to be their obligation to protect a healthy marketplace of
ideas in which, as Judge Learned Hand put it in 1943, "right conclusions
are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection."15 0 Even the requirement

Editorial Rules, 13 FCC Red. 18og (1998) (noting the deadlock among Commissioners about
whether to repeal the rules).
145 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7).
146 CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1981).
147 Children's Television Act of '990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. gg6 (codified as amended at
47 C.F.R. § 73.671 (2019)).
148 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779.
149 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,
io6 Stat. 1460.
150 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. i
(1945) see also Frank J. Kahn & Erwin G. Krasnow, The Public Interest in PoliticalBroadcasting:
Evaded, Eroded, and Eviscerated, 2 J. COMMC'NS & ENT. L. 635, 638 (1979) (noting that
§ 312(a)(7) appears to have been added to the Communications Act in order to ensure that "broadcasters who happen to favor incumbent candidates cannot continue to do so by forbidding the sale
of time to the opposition" (quoting Federal Election Campaign Act of 197L: Hearings Before the
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that broadcasters show a certain amount of educational children's television each week was motivated by the fear that the economic selfinterest of broadcasters would produce stultifying uniformity in the children's television market, and more specifically, would result in the
broadcasting of almost no educational children's programming, during
a historical period when children were spending more and more time

watching TV.15 1
Nor was it only Congress that acted to impose additional common
carrier and quasi-common carrier obligations on private media companies. So, too, did state governments and the FCC, which, in 2015, significantly expanded the regime of federal common carriage when it held
that broadband internet service providers (ISPs) should be treated as
common carriers under federal law. 152 To justify this decision, the
agency made many of the same free speech arguments it made seventy
years earlier to justify the fairness doctrine. Given an economic context
in which consumers frequently had no real choice in internet service
providers, 15 3 the FCC argued that its decision to designate ISPs as common carriers, and to prohibit them from "unreasonably interfer[ing] with
or . . . disadvantag[ing] . . . users' ability to
select,
access,
and
use . . . lawful Internet content, applications, services or devices,"1 54 did
not "burden[] free speech" but instead promoted it, by "ensuring a level
playing field for a wide variety of speakers who might otherwise be disadvantaged" and furthering "the paramount government interest in assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information
sources." 15 5 The echoes of the argument the FCC made to justify the
fairness doctrine are palpable. And although the FCC, under a new
administration, subsequently changed its mind about whether ISPs
should be treated as common carriers under federal law,156 in the wake
of the agency's rescission of its net neutrality rules, more than a dozen
states enacted similar laws (some as ordinary legislation and some by
executive order), and similar laws are on the horizon in many others. 157

Senate Subcomm. on Commc'ns of the Comm. on Com., 9 2d Cong. 348 (1971) (statement of Senators
Scott and Mathias))).
151 In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming and Revision of
Programming Policies for Television Broadcast Stations, ii FCC Red. io,66o, 10,674-76 (1996).
152 In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Red. 5601, 5615-16 (2015).
153 See id. at 5604.
154 Id. at 56og.
155 Id. at 5872.
156 In re Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Red. 311, 312 (2018).
157 Id. at 312; Thomas B. Nachbar, The Peculiar Case of State Network Neutrality
Regulation,
37 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 65g, 667-68 (2Q19); Heather Morton, Net Neutrality
Legislation, NAT'L

CONE. OF

STATE LEGISLATURES

(Jan.

19,

2021),

2020

https://www.ncsl.org/

research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/net-neutrality-2o2o-legislaton.aspx
[https://perma.cc/K86D-GCA6] (noting that twelve states, plus Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico,
introduced net-neutrality bills in the 2020 legislative session).
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What all this legislative, judicial, and, in a few cases, executivebranch activity has produced is a body of law that, notwithstanding the
controversies that have sometimes attended its implementation, imposes
speech-facilitating or nondiscrimination duties on virtually every technology of mass communication in the contemporary public sphere, with
the important, and marked, exception of internet content providers.
Even newspapers the private media companies whose First
Amendment right to absolute editorial autonomy was championed by
the Tornillo Court1 5 - are required by both state and federal law to
satisfy a number of nondiscrimination obligations, albeit narrow ones.
Under federal law, newspapers are prohibited from charging more for
political advertising than they charge for commercial advertising. 15 9 In
some states, newspapers are also prohibited from charging political candidates more to run their ads than they charge others. 160 And, in many
states, newspapers are forbidden from receiving money or any other
thing of value in exchange for their editorial endorsement of a political
candidate or an idea, 16 1 just as radio and television broadcasters are
prohibited by federal law.1 6 2 These laws, like the laws that impose nondiscrimination duties on cable companies, on radio and television broadcasters, and on telephone and telegraph companies, attempt in their own
small way to ensure that private control of important channels of mass
communication does not undermine the diversity and vitality of information available to the public writ large - that the economic selfinterest of newspaper publishers, or their political biases, or whatever
other predilections may determine their editorial choices, do not threaten
the ability of their readers to access a diverse range of viewpoints or
ideas.
The result is a vibrant, if contentious, body of media law that attempts to promote free speech values but does so in ways that are not
only not required by First Amendment jurisprudence but that are - as
I discuss in more detail in the next Part - quite difficult to justify under
existing First Amendment rules. It is nevertheless a body of law that,
as the net neutrality laws indicate, only continues to expand, and that

158 See supra note 7 2 and accompanying text.
159 52 U.S.C. § 0120(b).
3

160 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 211B.05(2) (2020) (prohibiting newspapers from charging some can-

didates for office more than others); W. VA. CODE § 59-3-6 (2020) (prohibiting newspapers from
charging political candidates more than "privatepatrons").
161 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 38 (2020); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-i0-o5 (2021); FLA.
STAT. § 10 4 .071(b) (2020); W. VA. CODE § 3 -8-11(d) (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-ii- 9 o1(6)(b)
(LexisNexis 2020).
162 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
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some argue should be expanded even further, to account for the new
problems of private censorship that have arisen in the internet age. 163
C. Worker Speech Protection Laws
It is not, of course, only laws that regulate the media that contribute
to the non-First Amendment law of freedom of speech. As the introductory example of the voter intimidation laws suggests, legislative efforts to promote free speech values by non-First Amendment means
affect many kinds of expressive relationships, not just those that take
place in the mass public sphere.
To get a sense of the scope and diversity of this body of law, consider
one last set of laws that contribute to the non-First Amendment free
speech tradition: the numerous local, state, and federal laws that protect
the freedom of workers to speak as they wish, and to associate with
whom they wish, against the economic coercion of their employers.
These laws, like the common carrier laws and postal laws, protect interests that the First Amendment protects - chief among these, what the
Court has described as the right of the individual "to speak freely
and . . . to refrain from speaking at all"11 6 4 - but do so for the most part
by allocating speech rights and duties differently than the First
Amendment cases do.
This is the case, even though, unlike the first two sets of examples,
the specific rights that these laws protect are also protected by the First
Amendment cases. The First Amendment neither grants, nor has ever
granted, anyone a right to subsidized mail delivery. Nor has it ever
granted anyone a right not to be discriminated against by a private media company. But the First Amendment does protect the right of (at
least some) workers to speak and associate without having to fear employment sanctions.
The worker speech rights that the First Amendment protects are relatively narrow, however. At present, it is only when a government
worker speaks on a matter of public concern and outside the scope of
her official duties that she has any possibility of First Amendment protection against employment sanctions motivated by that speech. 165

163 Scholars have recently suggested, for example, that lawmakers impose on Facebook and
Google and other internet platforms nondiscrimination duties similar to those imposed on telegraph
and telephone companies, in order to prevent important viewpoints from being excluded from these
vital public forums and their users "consuming a tainted or manipulated information stream." K.
Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the
Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1670 (2018); see also Frank Pasquale, Internet
NondiscriminationPrinciples: Commercial Ethicsfor Carriersand Search Engines, 2008 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 263, 288-89. They make, in other words, essentially the same arguments that lawmakers
made to justify the imposition of common carrier requirements on telegraph companies.
164 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
165 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).

2332

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 134:2299

Even then, her speech will be constitutionally protected only if a court
finds that the worker's expressive interests outweigh "the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees." 166
Statutory protection for workers' speech and association extends, in
some respects, much more broadly - although how much more broadly
depends significantly on the jurisdiction. But in all states, private as
well as government workers receive some amount of protection against
employment sanctions motivated by their speech and association. 167
They receive protection for speech that does not touch on matters of
public concern, as well as speech that does so. 168 And in some cases,
they also receive protection for speech uttered pursuant to their official
work responsibilities. 169
Statutory protection for workers' freedom of speech and association
also extends much further back in time than First Amendment protection for the same freedom. It was only in the 196as that the Supreme
Court recognized that government employers might violate the First
Amendment when they fired, refused to hire, or disciplined government
employees because of their speech or association. 1 0 Prior to that, the
Court assumed that, because individuals "have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but . . . [have] no constitutional right to be a policeman,"
the First Amendment usually wasn't implicated when the government
refused to hire, fired or disciplined workers because of what they said
or whom they associated with." Only after both the federal and state
governments began to aggressively purge Communists and fellow travelers from public employment during the Second Red Scare did the
Court recognize that granting government officials virtually unrestricted
power to hire, fire, or discipline whomever it wanted might threaten the
democratic and egalitarian values that the First Amendment protects. 1 2

166
167
168

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
See infra note 317 and accompanying text.

169 See, e.g., Trusz v. UBS Realty Invs., LLC, 123 A.

3

d 1212, 1214 (Conn. 2015).

170 The earliest case in which the Court interpreted the federal Constitution to prohibit speechmotivated employment sanctions against government workers was Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952), but Wieman was decided on due process grounds rather than First Amendment ones.
Id. at 191. It was only in the 1960s that the Court developed the modern doctrine of government
employee speech rights in cases such as Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
171 The language comes from Justice Holmes's opinion for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892), however, as the Court
noted in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), "[f]or many years . . . [it] expressed this Court's
law," id. at 144, that "a public employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms
of employment - including those which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights," id. at 143.
172 Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and
the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 66-67, 66 n.165, 67 n.167 (2006) (discussing
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Legislatures, in contrast, recognized the threat that the use of employment sanctions posed to the expressive freedom of workers and to democratic freedom writ large, more than a century before the federal courts
did. Indeed, the earliest worker speech protection laws date back as far
as the 1830s. In 1839, Ohio criminally prohibited employers from
"us[ing] any threat or coercion to procure any voter in his employ ...
to
vote contrary to the [employee's] inclination." 1 3 Over the next twenty
years, five other states and the then-territory of Nebraska enacted similar legislation.17 4 And in 1868, two more states - South Carolina and
Louisiana - enacted somewhat broader laws that prohibited employers
from, in the words of the South Carolina statute, "discharg[ing], or
threaten[ing] to discharge, from employment ...
any operative or employee . . . for or on account of his political opinion."1 7 5
That legislatures acted so much earlier than courts to protect worker
speech interests was in part a consequence of the partisan dynamics that
motivated them. Proponents of these laws were frequently members of
the Democratic Party - a party that tended to depend very heavily
during this period on the votes of the working men. 1 6 Fear that Whigsupporting employers were using their economic power to prevent their
supporters from voting appears to have motivated at least some of these
example, the 1846 Connecticut law.1
laws -for
That these laws emerged when they did cannot be chalked up merely
to political self-interest, however (at least not if we assume self-interest
to be a relatively constant feature of democratic politics). Instead, it
reflects the profound political as well as economic changes then taking
place in the American republic. When the federal Constitution was ratified, and for quite some time thereafter, most states denied the right to
vote to men who lacked property because they feared that men who
were economically dependent on others would not be able to exercise
the Court's effort in its public employee speech cases to protect against "the abuses of the McCarthy
era," id. at 66).
173 An Act to Punish Betting on Elections, § 1, 1838 Ohio Laws 79; see also Volokh, supra note

35, at

299-300-

174 Volokh, supra note 35, at 299.

175 Act of Sept. 26, 1868, No. 68,

§ XI,

1868 S.C. Acts 136, 137; accord Act of Sept. 4, 1868, No.

54, 1868 La. Acts 64, 64.

176 Both Isaac Toucey and Marcus Morton were Democrats, for example. See Charles Warren,
The CharlesRiver Bridge Case (pt. 2), 20 GREEN BAG 346, 354 (1908); Gov. Isaac Toucey, NAT'L
GOVERNORS ASS'N, https://www.nga.org/governor/isaac-toucey

[https://perma.cc/FgTZ-4UV7].

For discussion of the white working-class base of the nineteenth-century Democratic Party, see
Robert J. Cottroll, Law, Politics and Race in Urban America: Towards a New Synthesis, 17
RUTGERS L.J. 483, 509-13 (1986).
177 See Volokh, supra note 35, at 300. Chilton Williamson reports that in Connecticut in the midnineteenth century, Democrats believed that "Whig employers were influencing their employees in
the way which Blackstone had deplored."

CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE:

FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-186o, at 264 (196o). Williamson notes that "Whigs were
not discontented with this state of affairs, but Democrats, needless to say, were very much so." Id.
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meaningful political independence.1 78 By the early nineteenth century,
this restriction on the right of suffrage proved politically untenable because - given a quickly urbanizing and industrializing economy - it
meant depriving a large, growing proportion of the white male population of the right to vote. 1 9 This proved increasingly difficult to reconcile with the republican principles that were supposed to govern the new
country. 180
The result was a dramatic expansion in the scope of suffrage - and
the exact reaction by employers that opponents of expanding the right
to vote feared. An 1854 article published in the Boston-based journal,
Democratic Review, reported that voter intimidation was "constantly
practised" by private employers in Massachusetts and in the other manufacturing states.18 1 "Many [employers]," it asserted, "boldly avow their
right to discharge from employment those who vote against their peculiar interest."1 8 2 Even when workers were not fired, the author added,
"other means, quite as effectual as dismissal, are often employed to influence their votes, and [workers] soon find that their wages are diminished by their political opinions."1 8 3 Others reported much the same. 18 4
And the problem only appeared to get worse in the wake of the Civil
War, at least in the South. Military commanders and lawmakers reported that supporters of the defeated Confederacy were kicking tenants

178 ALEXANDER

KEYSSAR,

THE

RIGHT

TO

VOTE:

THE

CONTESTED

HISTORY

OF

DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 6-1o, tbl.A.1 (2000). Professor Keyssar notes that the ar-

gument that William Blackstone made in his Commentaries on the Law of England - that property
qualifications on voting were necessary to "exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation that
they are esteemed to have no will of their own" - "was repeated endlessly during the revolutionary
era" and endorsed by even such democratic thinkers as Thomas Jefferson, even if many of those
who made these arguments also articulated "an altogether contradictory argument," namely "that
the poor, or the propertyless, should not vote because they would threaten the interests of property."
Id. at 10-11 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769, at 165 (Univ. of Chi. Press

1979) (1765)).
179 Id. at 34.
180 See id. at 35-37.
181 Voting by Ballot, 3 U.S. DEMOCRATIC REV. 19,
24 (1854).
182 Id. It was easy to figure out whom someone voted for, given the highly public nature of the
process in the early and mid-nineteenth century. Because "voters ... obtained their ballots from
political parties . . . [and simply] drop[ped that] ballot in a box" to vote, and because "ballots tended
to be of different sizes, shapes, and colors, a man's vote was hardly a secret - to election officials,
party bosses, employers, or anyone else watching the polls." KEYSSAR, supra note 178, at 142.
183 Voting by Ballot, supra note 181, at 24.
184 Governor Isaac Toucey, Message from His Excellency to the Legislature of Connecticut (May
1846), in JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT,
MAY SESSION, 1846, at 25 [hereinafter Toucey Message].
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off their land and firing workers who dared to vote for Republican candidates, when they were not using more violent means to punish
Republicans for their votes. 1 5
Laws like the ones enacted in Massachusetts and Connecticut in the
1840s and 1850s, or South Carolina and Louisiana in the 186as, were a
response to what the author of the article in Democratic Review claimed
to be the uniquely American problem produced by the willingness of
American lawmakers to grant political rights to rich and poor (white
men) alike. 186 By making it a crime for employers to threaten workers
with the loss of their jobs if they did not vote as the employer desired or
if they did not break their ties to a political party the employer despised,
lawmakers attempted not only to save their own political hides, but also
to protect the political autonomy of laboring men and the integrity of
the democratic system writ large.1" The Governor of Connecticut certainly argued as much, when he urged the state legislature to criminalize
the act of worker vote intimidation, which it did the same year188:

"

The elector [i.e., the voter] is bound by an oath to the faithful discharge of
his duty. By the whole theory of republican government, he, as one of the
people, is to pass upon all laws and their administration. The whole country
has a deep interest in the independent as well as intelligent exercise of the
electoral franchise by every citizen in it. . . . [I]f the proprietors of an establishment, employing several hundreds of workmen, are to be considered as
the proprietors of their votes, and when they purchase their labor for a
pecuniary consideration, are to be considered as purchasing for the same
consideration their rights as independent citizens at the ballot box, in whatever manner or under whatever color it may be done, the evil is too intoler1
able to be permitted to exist in a free country.

In 1840, the Governor of Massachusetts similarly argued that legislative action was "needed to protect the laboring classes, and the poorer

185 See Gen. Ords. No. 57 (Apr. io, 1868), S. EXEC. Doc. NO. 13, at 91 ('870) ("[N]umerous
complaints have been made at these headquarters that ... laborers will be intimidated from voting
at the approaching election by fear of the loss of employment."); i THE DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 43

(Richmond, New Nation 1868) [hereinafter VIRGINIA DEBATES] ("[M]any laboring men of Virginia
are reported as having been thrown out of employment, because they conscientiously exercised the
rights of American citizens in voting the Republican ticket, and are on that account thrown with
their families on the cold charity of the world.").
186 Voting by Ballot, supra note 181, at 21 ("There is one reason ... why voters are here more
exposed to intimidation than in most other countries. Universal suffrage exists at present . . . in no
nation of Europe, and only privileged orders share in many of its representative systems. There is
no danger of coercion being employed where the poorer classes are not included in the electoral
body.... But here, where every man is a voter - the powerful capitalist and the dependent laborer - where votes are to be given by the one extreme of society, which may affect the pecuniary
interests of the other, the practice of intimidation is especially to be feared.").
187 KEYSSAR, supra note 178, at 49-50.
188 See Volokh, supra note 35, at 300 n.i5.
189 Toucey Message, supra note 184, at 25-26.
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portion of the community, from unjust and oppressive influences, and
to secure to them more perfect independence and freedom of political
action." 190 "The genius of liberty," the Governor added, "requires of
every rational soul a free and honest expression of his unbiased convictions and volitions. [An employer who infringes] this right, and corrupt[s], at its source, the freedom of elections . . . cannot be a real friend
of the equal rights of man, nor a sincere supporter of the true principles
of the government under which he lives." 191
As these quotes make clear, and much like the telegraph laws that
many of these same states enacted a few years later, these early speech
protection laws for workers were an attempt to protect, for both selfinterested and principled reasons, exercises of expressive freedom that
appeared necessary to the preservation of democratic government in the
United States against concentrated economic power - specifically, in
this case, the concentrated economic power of the "[m]anufacturers" that
a Connecticut lawmaker noted in the early 18aas were "rapidly increasing" in the country. 1 92
The restrictions these laws imposed on the common law prerogatives
of the employer to hire and fire at will made them quite controversial. 193
The author of the article in Democratic Review argued, for example,
that notwithstanding the epidemic of employer voter intimidation in the
country, legislators should not make it a crime for employers to fire or
threaten to fire their employees because of how they voted or planned
to vote. Such a law, he claimed, would "trench[] upon the offender's
right of property" and "interfer[e] with his disposal of that which is his
own." 194 Similar arguments ultimately defeated a proposal introduced
during the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1867195 to "cloth[e] the
General Assembly with power to declare and punish as a misdemeanor
the discharge of any . .. laborer on account of his political opinions." 196
A member of the Convention, Mr. Liggett, argued that the problem of
worker coercion in Virginia surely could not be so dire as to make "necessary ... a despotism ... which shall say to every man whom he may,
and whom he may not discharge." 197

190 Governor Marcus Morton, Address of His Excellency Marcus Morton to the Two Branches
of the Legislature 14 (Jan. 1, 1840) [hereinafter Morton Address].
191 Id. at 15.
192 KEYSSAR, supra note 178,
at 47.
193 For a discussion of employers' common law contractual rights in the early and mid-nineteenth
century, see Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118, 122-24 (1976).
194 Voting by Ballot, supra note 181, at 22.
195 See Volokh, supra note 35, at 301 n.ig.

196 VIRGINIA DEBATES, supra note 185, at 46.
197

Id.
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Despite the sometimes-heated opposition they generated, however,
legislative efforts to protect workers' political independence by limiting
the common law rights of employers to govern the workplace as they
saw fit only proliferated in subsequent decades - presumably because
the power that the "manufacturers" wielded over their workers' political
activities remained a problem, notwithstanding the increasing use of the
secret ballot in local, state, and federal elections. 198 Over the next 150
years, many more states, territories, and municipalities made it illegal
for employers to fire, not hire, discipline, and/or coerce workers because
of their political expression. 199
Some of these laws were as narrow, or almost as narrow, as the laws
enacted in the early 183as and 1840s. They protected workers only
against employer efforts to coerce their vote or to punish them for how
they had voted.20 0
Other laws were considerably broader and prohibited employers
from attempting to influence or constrain or, in some cases, from enacting workplace rules that had the effect of influencing or constraining
workers' political expression generally.
In 1915, for example, the
California legislature made it both a crime and a civil violation for employers to "make, adopt or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy [that
f]orb[ade] or prevent[ed] employees from engaging or participating in
politics or from becoming candidates for public office [or that c]ontroll[ed] or direct[ed], or tend[ed] to control or direct the political activities or affiliations of employees." 20 1 The legislature also made it both a
crime and a civil violation for an employer to fire, or threaten to fire,
employees in order to "coerce or influence [them] . . . to adopt or follow
or refrain from adopting or following any particular course or line of
political action or political activity." 20 2 In 1938, the state of Louisiana
enacted a very similarly worded law. 20 3

198 KEYSSAR, supra note 178, at 142-43 (discussing the increasing use of the secret ballot).
199 See Volokh, supra note 35, at 301, 309-33 (describing statutes protecting employees' political

rights).
200 For example, in i9oo, the state of Kentucky banned corporations from "influenc[ing] ... by
bribe, favor, promise, inducement, threat or otherwise, the vote or suffrage of any employee or
servant of such corporation against or in favor of any candidate, platform or principles or issue in
any election." Act of Mar. 17, 1900, ch. 12, § 3, 1900 Ky. Acts 41, 43 (available at Hein's Session
Laws Library). More than sixty years later, the North Carolina legislature made it a misdemeanor
for "any person . . . to discharge or threaten to discharge from employment, or otherwise intimidate
or oppose any legally qualified voter on account of any vote such voter may cast or consider or
intend to cast, or not to cast, or which he may have failed to cast." Act of June 14, 1967, ch. 775,
§ 163-274(6), 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 959, 960 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163274(a)(7) (West 2021)).

CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101 (West 2021).
202 Id. § 1102.
203 LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:961 (2021).
201
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Beginning in the late 186as, both state and federal lawmakers also
began to provide specialized statutory protection to civil service workers
who faced political threats and coercion at work. 20 4 These laws, unlike
the earlier ones, were not a response to the threat that the growing power
of private manufacturers posed to democratic principles. Instead, they
were a response to the threat that another set of powerful private entities - namely, the political party machines that controlled government
hiring decisions - posed to those principles. 2 05 The result nonetheless
was additional protection for the political speech and association of government workers.
Statutory development didn't stop here. By the end of the nineteenth
century, both the federal government and states began to extend statutory protection to workers' pro-labor speech and association, not just
their political speech and association. In 1898, for example, Congress
passed the Erdman Act of 1898,206 which prohibited railroad companies
and other common carriers from "discriminat[ing] against any employee
because of his membership in . . . a labor . . . organization" or from "requir[ing] any employee, or any person seeking employment, as a condition of such employment, to enter into an agreement . .. not to become
or remain a member of any labor . . . organization." 2 07 Many states enacted similar measures. 2 08 Other states directly prohibited employers
from disciplining or firing workers because of their pro-union speech or
organizing activities. 2 09

204 The first federal law of this kind was enacted in 1867 and Congress made it a crime for
government agents or employees to "require or request any workingman in any navy yard to contribute or pay any money for political purposes" or to "remove[] or discharge[] [any workingman]

-

for [his] political opinion[s]." Naval Appropriations Act of 1867, ch. 172, § 3, 14 Stat. 489, 492. It
was soon followed by the more expansive 1883 Pendleton Act, which made it unlawful to "discharge, or promote, or degrade ... for giving or withholding or neglecting to make any contribution
of money or other valuable thing for any political purpose." Civil Service Act, ch. 27, § 13, 22 Stat.
403, 407 (1883). Many states enacted similar laws in subsequent years. Developments in the Law
Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1628 n.6o (1984).
205 See Developments in the Law Public Employment, supra note 204, at 1627-28; see also
Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separationof Powers: Checking Today's Most DangerousBranchfrom
Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2334 n.75 (2006) (noting that, at the time, one of the arguments for the
Pendleton Act was that it was necessary to prevent "political servitude" and to stop "honest but
mistaken" civil servants from "becom[ing] a suppliant for the official crumbs which fall from the
table of some political master" (quoting S. REP. NO. 47-576, at iv (1882))).
206 Ch. 370, § io, Pub. L. No. 55-370, 30 Stat. 424, 428, invalidated by Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161 (19a8).
207 Id.
208 WILLIAM

E.

FORBATH,

LAW

AND

THE

SHAPING

OF

THE

AMERICAN

LABOR

MOVEMENT 177-78 (1991) (listing statutes).
209 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-102 (West 2021); An Act to Protect Employees and

Guarantee Their Right to Belong to Labor Organizations, Hurd's Rev. Stat. (Ill.) § 32 (June 17,
1893); An Act to Provide a Penalty for Coercing or Influencing or Making Demands upon or
Requirements of Employees, Servants, Laborers, and Persons Seeking Employment, Gen. Stat.
(Kan.) @@ 4674-4675 (Mar. 13, 1909).
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These laws were a response to sustained pressure by labor groups
like the American Federation of Labor (AFL). These groups argued
that ensuring republican values in an age of industrial capitalism required protecting not only the right of workers to participate in political
struggles beyond the workplace but also their ability to exercise some
measure of political agency at work. This view was eloquently expressed by a program promulgated by the AFL in 1918 that insisted that
because the rules that governed the workplace "affect . . . workers' opportunities in life and determine their standard of living . . . more than
legislative enactments" it was "essential that the workers should have a
voice in determining the laws within industry and commerce . .. equivalent to the voice which they have as citizens in determining the legislative enactments ... ."210 This is what the early labor laws attempted
to guarantee.
Although most of these laws were struck down by state and federal
courts on freedom of contract grounds, by the end of the 1930s, the
Court, facing a severe political crisis of its own, instead declared "[d]iscrimination and coercion [by employers] to prevent the free exercise of
the right of employees to self-organization and representation" to be "a
proper subject for condemnation by competent legislative authority." 2 1 1
The result was to allow Congress, as well as the state legislatures, to
enact and enforce a new generation of labor laws, like the National

Labor Relations Act of

1935212

(NLRA), that granted significant protec-

-

tion to both public- and private-sector workers for their work-related
speech and association - protection that Congress, for its part, made
clear when it enacted the NLRA was motivated by a desire to "protect[]
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association." 2 1 3
Today, as a result of all this legislative activity, a significant body of
what Professor Cynthia Estlund has described as "quasi-First
Amendment law" protects the expressive autonomy of public- and
private-sector workers even when the First Amendment cases do not.2 14
Under current law, employers in the majority of states are not only prohibited from firing, not hiring, and/or disciplining both private- and
public-sector workers for their political as well as work-related speech
and association, but are also required to facilitate workers' speech
by, for example, adjusting workers' schedules to allow them to attend
political party meetings, or by giving them paid time off to vote, or by

210 American Federation of Labor Reconstruction Program, reprinted in TRADE UNIONISM
AND LABOR PROBLEMS (SECOND SERIES) 563 (John R. Commons ed., 1921).

211 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
213 Id. § 151.
214 Estlund, supra note 12, at 107.
212
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granting them access to employer property for union organizing purposes. 215 A vast network of laws also protects public- as well as privatesector workers when they engage in whistleblowing speech - that is to
say, when they publicly report fraud, waste, or abuse at work. 21 6
Employers in many states are also prohibited from coercing or attempting to coerce workers' political speech and association. 217 Under
the NLRA, employers are also prohibited from "threat[ening] . . . reprisal . . . or promis[ing a] benefit" if workers do or do not vote to join
a union, or go on strike, or engage in other statutorily protected expressive activity.218 And in some states, employers are prohibited from "requir[ing] ...
employees to ... participate in any communications with
the employer or its agents or representatives, the purpose of which is to
communicate the employer's opinion about religious or political matters." 219 The assumption underlying this last and most recent group of
what we might call "captive audience laws," is that requiring employees
to listen to the employer's views on non-work-related matters is inherently coercive because it violates the employees' right not to hear or not
to associate with speech they dislike. 220
In a few states, protection for workers' speech extends beyond political and work-related speech and association, or even the religious
speech regulated by the captive audience laws. The Connecticut Free
Speech Act makes it unlawful, for example, for either public or private
employers to "subject[] any employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise . . . of rights guaranteed by [either] the [F]irst
[A]mendment ...
or ...
the [Connecticut State] Constitution. 221 Courts
have interpreted this to mean that workers in Connecticut are protected
against employment-motivated sanctions for all speech they utter on
matters of public concern, except when they speak pursuant to their
official duties. 222 In those cases, their speech will be protected only if it
215 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-1-5 (2021); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-10-603 (West 2021);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,

§

7-101 (West 2020); see also NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S.

105, 111 (1956) (discussing the varying property access rights of employees and nonemployees under

the NLRA).
216 See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower
Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99 (2000) (documenting the federal whistleblower laws as well as the
laws that have been enacted in all fifty states).
217 See infra notes 346-348 and accompanying text.
218 29 U.S.C. § 158(c).
219 N.J. STAT. ANN.

V.I.

§

34:19-10 (West 2020); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 659.785 (West

2020);

CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 620 (2018); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.32, 111.321 (West 2020).

220 See Defendant Brad Avakian's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 9io, Associated Or. Indus. v. Avakian, No. 3:09-CV-1494 (D. Or. May 6, 2010) (explaining that the
Oregon law "establishes an important job-related right - the right to walk away from unwanted
communication about politics or religion - and provides workers with a cause of action, similar to
the common-law tort of wrongful discharge, to protect that right").
221 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West 2020).
222 See Schumann v. Dianon Sys., Inc., 43 A. d 111, 122-23 (Conn. 2012).
3
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"implicates an employer's 'official dishonesty . .. other serious wrong22 3
doing, or threats to health and safety.'"
In New York, meanwhile, the legislature enacted a law in 1992 that
prohibits employers from refusing to hire, firing, or otherwise discriminating against employees because of their off-duty "political activities"
or their off-duty "recreational activities" - a category that the legislature defined to include the expressive acts of "reading and the viewing
of television, movies and similar material." 2 2 4 The purpose of this law
was not to protect the expressive freedom of workers per se. Like even
broader statutes enacted around the same time in Colorado and North
Dakota, its primary purpose appears to have been to prevent employers
from firing workers because they smoked, or from engaging in other acts
discrimination." 225
"lifestyle
called
sometimes
of what was
Nevertheless, like the other laws discussed in this section, the New York
law was an attempt to prevent employers from using the economic
power that the employment relationship gave them to render workers
subordinate to them in some important, democratically troubling, way.
As the sponsor of the bill argued, during legislative debates: "[W]e have
long since passed the days of company towns, where the company told
you when to work, where to live and what to buy in their stores. This
bill would ensure that employers do not tell us how to think and play
on our own time." 226 The result, once again, was statutory protection
for rights the First Amendment protects - in this case, what the Court
in Stanley v. Georgia described as the "right to read or observe what
[one] pleases" and "to satisfy [one's] intellectual and emotional needs in
the privacy of [one's] own home" - but protection that was not articulated in a constitutional language. 227
As this very brief summary suggests, a dense web of laws protects
many different aspects of public- as well as private-sector workers' freedom of speech and association against employment sanctions, threats,
and coercion. The strength of this body of law varies considerably and

223 Trusz v. UBS Realty Invs., LLC, 123 A. 3 d 1212, 1232 (Conn. 2015) (quoting Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 435 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
224 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(I)(b) (McKinney 2020). The statute defines political activities to
mean "(i) running for public office, (ii) campaigning for a candidate for public office, or (iii) participating in fund-raising activities for the benefit of a candidate, political party or political advocacy
group." Id. § 2o1-d(I)(a).
225

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

24-34-402.5 (West 2020); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.

§

14-02.4-03

(West 2021); Jessica Jackson, Colorado'sLifestyle Discrimination Statute: A Vast and Muddled Expansion of TraditionalEmployment Law, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 143, 143 n.5 (1996) (noting that the
Colorado bill "was proposed by the tobacco lobby" but extended to protect all "'lawful activities' . . . [in] an effort to make the bill more appealing to the legislature as a whole").
226 Alyce H. Rogers, Employer Regulation of Romantic Relationships:The Unsettled Law of New
York State, 13 TOURO L. REV. 687, 69o (1997) (quoting Sen. James J. Lack Mem., Ch. 776, N.Y.S.
LEGIS. ANN. (1992)).
227 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
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has fluctuated over time in response to changing political winds. The
NLRA, for example, provides much narrower protection for workers'
speech and association today than it once did. 228 This body of labor,
employment, and election law nevertheless continues to provide significantly more protection for many kinds of worker speech and association
than the First Amendment does. And it does so for precisely the same
reason that the First Amendment protects the speech of government
workers: because legislators have come to believe, just as courts have,
that allowing employers unimpeded freedom to use their economic
power to constrain their employees' speech threatens the vitality of the
marketplace of ideas and undermines the political, and perhaps also social, equality that is a crucial precondition of democracy.
II. A PLURALISTIC FREE SPEECH TRADITION
As the previous Part indicates, the First Amendment's Free Speech
and Press Clauses are by no means the only legal instruments that protect the expressive autonomy of private individuals in the United States,
or that attempt to ensure that public debate on public issues is uninhibited, robust, and wide open. Instead, a thick body of federal, state, and
local law - much of it not constitutional - promotes these and other
First Amendment interests but does so by granting speech rights and by
imposing speech-facilitating duties on private and government actors
that are quite different than those the First Amendment requires.
The laws canvassed in the previous Part may in fact represent only
the tip of the iceberg that is the non-First Amendment law of freedom
of speech. Many other local, state, and federal laws work to protect free
speech values by non-First Amendment means. This is true, for example, of the many state laws that prohibit both public and private school
and university administrators from disciplining students for their speech
even when the First Amendment does not require it,229 the local and
state laws that prohibit landlords and places of public accommodation
from discriminating against members of the public because of their
viewpoint, 230 the many state laws that prohibit the use of otherwise

228 See CELINE MCNICHOLAS, MARGARET POYDOCK & LYNN RHINEHART, ECONOMIC
POLICY INSTITUTE,

UNPRECEDENTED: THE

TRUMP NLRB'S

ATTACK ON WORKERS'

RIGHTS (2019) (describing the significant narrowing of the scope of protection afforded workers
under the NLRA that has occurred under the Trump Administration). See generally Cynthia L.
Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002).
229 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE 99 4895o, 66301, 94367 (West 2020); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-1-120 (West 2020); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 336.477 (West 2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-i81203 (West 2020); For a general overview of these laws, see New Voices, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR.,
https://splc.org/new-voices [https://perma.cc/TPgX-5 DAR].
230 See, e.g., Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 56 (Colo. 1991); State v. Schmid, 423
A.2d 615, 629-31 (N.J. 0980); Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979).
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valid tort laws when the purpose of the suit is to chill others' expression, 2 3 1 the state and federal open records laws that require government
actors to disclose information about their activities to members of the
public, 2 32 the state and federal laws that provide journalists special privileges because of the important structural role they play in American
democracy 233 - the list goes on and on.
The existence of this sizable body of law makes it clear that the
American system of free expression is not composed entirely - or even,
perhaps, primarily - of federal constitutional law. As the list of laws
in the previous paragraph suggests, whether an individual can exercise
the kinds of expressive and associational autonomy that the First
Amendment protects in principle will often depend in practice less on
the details of First Amendment doctrine than on the existence of other
local, state, or federal laws. This is a significant fact about the regulation of speech in the United States, but one that gets obscured by the
tendency of scholars to equate the First Amendment free speech tradition with the American free speech tradition more broadly.
That nonconstitutional law would come to play the important role in
the American system of free expression that it does today wasn't inevitable. The Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution vests the federal
courts with the power to establish not only a floor of rights protection
a minimum set of rights that no government actors may infringe - but
also a ceiling. 234 Particularly when it comes to the many state and federal laws that protect the free speech rights of some private individuals
by restricting the property and speech rights of others (think here of the
common carriage laws described in section I.B, or the employment, labor, and election laws described in section I.C), the Court could have set
the federal constitutional ceiling very low. It easily could have interpreted the First Amendment or other constitutional provisions like the
Takings Clause to deprive legislatures, agencies, or other government
actors of the power to add significantly to the rights that the First

231 See David L. Hudson, Jr., Anti-SLAPP Coverage and the First Amendment: Hurdles to
Defamation Suits in PoliticalCampaigns, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 1541, 1542-49 (2020) (discussing the
emergence and rationale of these laws). For a current listing of state laws that prohibit "strategic
lawsuit against public participation" or SLAPP suits, see State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB.
PARTICIPATION

PROJECT,

https://anti-slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection

[https://perma.cc/3VQS-DRV8].
232 Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86
MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1159-61 (2002).
233 Sonja R. West, Favoring the Press, 1o6 CALIF. L. REV. g1, 115-i8 (2018) (describing the various laws that grant special privileges to the institutional press).
234 See John E. Simonett, An Introduction to Essays on the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 227, 234 (1994) ("[T]he state may not raise its constitutional protection for a
particular civil liberty so far above the federal floor that it bumps against the federal floor for some
other competing civil right; in this case the federal floor becomes a ceiling.").
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Amendment provides. In other areas of law, the Court has in fact used
the authority granted it by the Supremacy Clause to do just that. 235
But while there are some First Amendment cases - Tornillo, for
example - in which the Court did set the constitutional ceiling very
close to the constitutional floor, for the most part the Court has not interpreted the First Amendment so restrictively. 236 Instead, in a wide
variety of decisions, the Court has permitted legislatures, regulatory
agencies, and state courts to grant speech rights and impose speechfacilitating duties that the First Amendment does not require, even
when doing so has the effect of intruding to some degree on constitutionally protected property or expressive autonomy interests. The most
famous, or infamous, example of this is the 1969 decision in Red Lion v.
FCC237 which found the right of reply rules that made up part of the
fairness doctrine to be a constitutional attempt by Congress to effectuate
the core purpose of the First Amendment as recognized by the Court;
namely, to "preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of
that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee," notwithstanding the significant constraints they imposed on the
editorial autonomy of radio broadcasters. 238 But there are many other
cases, besides Red Lion, in which the Court has affirmed the constitutionality of non-First Amendment free speech laws. 239
The result has been to grant other branches of the federal government, and other governments, considerable power to vindicate free
speech values in their own ways. As Part I makes clear, this is a power
that these other governmental actors have sometimes exercised with
vigor. What this has produced is a system of free expression in which
legislatures as well as courts play an important role in defining speech
rights and duties, and always have.
Recognizing this fact has important implications for how we evaluate the system of free expression in the United States. It means that if
we want to understand how well the existing body of free speech law is

235 The Court has done so, for example, in its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, by vesting
Congress with very limited power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to interpret section
i of the amendment differently than the Court interprets it. See Douglas Laycock, Federalism as
a Structural Threat to Liberty, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 67, 76 (1998).
236 As the discussion in section I.C demonstrates, even Tornillo has not been interpreted to deprive lawmakers of all power to promote free speech values by constraining the "editorial control
and judgment" of newspaper editors. Mia. Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
But it has certainly constrained their discretion in very significant ways. See supra section I.C, pp.
2331-2342.

23 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
238 Id. at 390.
239 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 224-25 (1997); PruneYard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 ('980); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521-23 (1976); NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618-20 (1969); United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.

75, 103 (1947); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,

20

(1945).
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achieving the goals we set for it, we cannot look only to the constitutional law cases. Given the very significant constraints on the scope of
the First Amendment's application, it is entirely possible that even the
most speech-protective constitutional doctrines would not achieve the
purposes the First Amendment is intended to, in the absence of other
kinds of regulation. Conversely, a very weak constitutional jurisprudence might not matter in a world in which there was vigorous legislative protection for freedom of speech (or, alternatively, a vigorous free
speech culture). We simply cannot know how well our system works to
promote free speech values if we look only at the First Amendment
cases.
Recognizing the important role that nonconstitutional laws play in
the American system of free expression also has significant descriptive
implications. It changes how we understand both the historical and the
contemporary operation of the system of free expression in the United
States. In this Part, I spell out what those implications are before exploring, in Part III, their consequences for First Amendment doctrine.
A.

Our PluralisticPast

The first thing that recognizing laws like the postal laws, or the common carrier laws, or the worker protection laws as free speech laws
changes is our view of the past. For decades now, it has been widely
accepted that the hegemonic conception of freedom of speech in the
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century legal debates was what we might
describe as a "weakly libertarian" one. There has been intense debate
about precisely how weak, or precisely how libertarian, the eighteenthand nineteenth-century view of freedom of speech was. 24 0 But virtually
no one disputes that the dominant view of freedom of speech was that
it entitled the individual to, as Justice Story put it in 1833, "speak, write,
and print his opinions upon any subject whatsoever," without governmental sanctions, but protected this negative liberty only so long as what
was spoken, written, or printed did not "injure any other person . . . [or]

240 Debate has raged, for example, about whether the men who ratified the First Amendment
and state constitutional free expression guarantees intended to abolish the law of seditious libel.
Compare Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 947 (1919)
(arguing that they did), with LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 168 (1985)

(arguing that they probably did not). More recently, scholars have debated the extent to which late
nineteenth-century jurists like Chief Justice Cooley and Dean Christopher Tiedeman articulated a
distinctive "conservative libertarian" view of freedom of speech. Compare MARK A. GRABER,
TRANSFORMING

FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM

(1991) (making this argument), with Charles L. Barzun, Politics or Principle? Zechariah Chafee

and the Social Interest in Free Speech, 2007 BYU L. REV. 259, 268-83 (criticizing the claim for
resting on weak historical foundations).
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disturb the public peace, or attempt to subvert the government," as determined by a jury.241 Nor is there much dispute that, in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, it was relatively easy to convince juries that
speech did threaten the public peace or attempt to subvert the government - that what this view of freedom of speech produced was a rather
enervated body of state and federal constitutional law: one in which the
right to freedom of speech was frequently claimed to be of crucial democratic importance, but in practice constrained the government's power
very little. 242
Recent scholarship on nineteenth-century legal debates about the
federal and state constitutional free expression guarantees has complicated this story somewhat by suggesting that, rather than the unchallenged "consensus about the boundaries of free speech" that an earlier
generation of scholars espied in the nineteenth century,243 there was in
fact considerable disagreement about precisely what kinds of speech
posed a sufficient threat to public peace or morality to warrant repression.244 Nevertheless, the conclusion this new body of historical scholarship tends to reach is, in its broad outlines, the same one that the
earlier histories reached: namely, that "nineteenth-century America embraced a strong libertarian ideology that endorsed a press unrestrained
by government even in the most trying times," but "did not prohibit
suppression of expression by the community itself" when that expression
violated the community's social norms, as determined by a jury.245
Almost entirely missing from this body of scholarship, however, is
any analysis of the nonconstitutional debates about expressive freedom

241 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§

993, at 704 (Hilliard, Gray & Co. ed., 1833).
242 Donna I. Dennis, Obscenity Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century
United States, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 369, 383 (2002) ("Antebellum jurists and treatise writers
routinely interpreted the common law of nuisance and obscene libel to give local authorities extremely broad powers to punish any form of expression that had a tendency to promote indecency
or corrupt morality . . . In this regulatory regime, the state's authority to suppress immorality nec-

essarily trumped individual claims to freedom of speech or freedom of the press."); Rabban, supra
note 14, at 523-24 (noting that nineteenth-century judicial "[o]pinions constantly reiterated that the
First Amendment and analogous provisions of state constitutions do not protect 'license' or the
'abuse' of speech.").
243 Friedman, supra note 13, at 5-6.
244 GRABER, supra note 240, at 46-48 (noting that nineteenth- and twentieth-century "conservative libertarians" believed that "doctrines attacking the principles of republican government had no
claim to free speech protection" had "clear[] ... repressive implications" and also that the "military
needs of the state ... required that the government be able to use the war power to curtail such
personal freedoms as free speech").
245 DICKERSON, supra note 22, at xii-xiii (italics omitted); see also FELDMAN, supra note 22,
at 119-20 ("Despite the vitality of the tradition of [political] dissent" in nineteenth-century America,
"[a]n individual was free to speak or write so long as he remained roughly within the broad mainstream of culture and opinion, but social penalties were severe for those who ventured outside those
borders.").
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that took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As Part I
makes quite clear, it wasn't only when discussing the meaning of the
state or federal constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech that legislators invoked ideas of expressive liberty or attempted to vindicate
what we recognize today to be First Amendment interests and rights.
There was also vigorous discussion throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries about the extent of the government's duty to protect the
expressive and associational freedom of its citizens and subjects, not because it was obligated to do so by a specific constitutional clause, but
because this was what a commitment to democratic principles required.
Including these debates in the story changes it considerably. This is
because the view of freedom of speech that informed these debates was
not a weakly libertarian one. When Elbridge Gerry insisted in 1791, for
example, that "the House ought to adopt measures by which the information, contained in any one paper ... might immediately spread from
one extremity of the continent to the other . . . [so that] the whole body
of the citizens [would] be enabled to . . . guard against any evil that may
threaten them," he was not making a libertarian argument for freedom
of speech, weak or strong. 246 Nor was the Senate Committee on PostOffices and Post-Roads, when it argued that Congress should create a
postal telegraph because it would be "for the press a proclamation of
emancipation, and it will not be really a free press until it, or something
like it, is enacted into a law." 247 Nor, for that matter, was the Governor
of Connecticut, when he argued in 1846 that allowing employers to interfere with their workers' "independent as well as intelligent exercise
of the electoral franchise" was an "evil . . . too intolerable to be permitted to exist in a free country." 248
In all of these cases, the claim was not that the government merely
had a negative obligation to refrain from punishing nonharmful speech.
The claim was instead that the government had a positive obligation to
regulate the conditions under which speech occurred when doing so was
necessary to safeguard viewpoint diversity in the public sphere, political
equality, or some other important democratic good.
What these debates and the laws they helped produce reveal is not
only that there was more vigorous enforcement of at least certain kinds
of speech rights - the right to receive nondiscriminatory telegraph service, for example, or the right to vote free of employer coercion, or the
right to subsidized postal service - than we typically recognize. They
also suggest that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century lawmakers had a
246 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 289 (1791).
247 S. REP. NO. 48-577, pt. i, at 19 (1884) (noting also that "[i]t is only the fact of a monopolized

news distribution which makes a news censorship [by Western Union and the AP] possible" and
that, because the "telegraphic news is the breath of life of the daily press, .. . to receive such news
practically at the will of one company is an intolerable condition, degrading to the newspapers and
alarming to the country").
248 Toucey Message, supra note 184, at 25-26.
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more complicated and a less complacent view of what kinds of expressive liberty a democratic society requires than the conventional story
reveals. It may have been the case, as Professor Donna Lee Dickerson
argues, that most people in the nineteenth century assumed that conventional moral norms should guide the legal regulation of speech and
that indecent or immoral speech should therefore receive no legal protection. 24 9 But this does not mean that "[f]reedom of expression issues. . . were local problems that each community dealt with in its own
way" without much state or federal involvement. 25 0 Nor does it mean
that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century lawmakers assumed that all
that was required to ensure what Dean Christopher Tiedeman described in 1886 as "[the] popular government and . . . freedom from tyranny" that was "only possible when the people enjoy the freedom of
speech, and the liberty of the press," 25 1 were the weak limits that the
state and federal constitutions imposed on the government's ability to
punish speech. Instead, many lawmakers also believed that the government had to create the conditions under which freedom of speech could
flourish - and this includes some of the lawmakers who wrote and
ratified the First Amendment itself.25 2
It is true, of course, that those who argued in favor of the postal laws,
the common carrier laws, or the worker speech protection laws didn't
tend to use the phrases "freedom of speech" or "freedom of press" to
describe the speech-fostering duties that they believed democratic principles imposed on the government (although the Senate committee report on the postal telegraph makes clear that they sometimes did). But
they did claim that legislative action was necessary to protect what the
Governor of Massachusetts described as the right of "every rational soul
[to] . . . free[ly] and honest[ly] express[] . . . his unbiased convictions and
volitions," 25 3 as well as the "intelligence . . . of the people" that was the
ultimate guarantee of democratic government. 25 4 They attempted to
protect free speech interests, in other words, even if they did not use the
(largely constitutional) language of freedom of speech.
What these debates thus illuminate is the existence of what we might
call a second strand of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century discourse and
practice about freedom of speech - one that, in contrast to the first,
constitutional strand of discourse and practice, assumed that govern-

249 DICKERSON, supra note 22, at xv.

250 Id. at xiii.
251

CHRISTOPHER GUSTAVUS TIEDEMAN, TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE

POWER IN THE

UNITED

STATES CONSIDERED FROM

BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL

STANDPOINT § 81 (photo. reprt. 2001) (1886).
252 James Madison, for example, not only wrote the first draft of the Bill of Rights but also was
an important supporter of the Post Office Act. JOHN, supra note 26, at 60-63.
253 Morton Address, supra note 1go, at 15.
254 Id. at ii.
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ment intervention into the marketplace of ideas was sometimes necessary to protect expressive liberty and the democratic values it facilitated.
The two strands were not incompatible with one another. Both, after
all, granted the government considerable power to regulate speech when
necessary to promote the public good.
The second strand of free speech discourse and practice would have,
however, a much more lasting impact on the modern system of free expression than the first. This is because the rather extensive body of
constitutional discourse and practice that reflected the weakly libertarian view of the First Amendment was rendered almost completely irrelevant to anyone but historians by the Court's embrace in the 1930s and
1940s of a much more strongly libertarian view of the free speech
right. 255 After this point, the fine distinction that jurists like Tiedeman
or Justice Story drew to delimit the constitutional right to freedom of
speech simply didn't inform to any meaningful degree how courts actually interpreted the First Amendment - or, for the most part, the state
constitutional free expression guarantees. 25 6
In contrast, the non-First Amendment laws of freedom of speech
continued to apply with full force, in large part because the Court adamantly refused to interpret the new, much more strongly libertarian
First Amendment to require the invalidation of the many state and federal laws that lawmakers had by then enacted to promote free speech
values by nonconstitutional means. 257 Instead, the Court made clear in
a number of significant cases that legislatures and regulatory agencies
continued to possess considerable power to intervene in the speech marketplace when doing so promoted the same values as the First
Amendment did. 258 In its 1194 decision in Associated Press v. United
States, 25 9 for example, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge
to a district court order that interpreted the Sherman Antitrust Act 26 0 to
require the AP to comply with very similar nondiscrimination duties to
those the earlier generation of newsgathering common carrier laws had
imposed. 26 1 "It would be strange indeed," Justice Black wrote for the
majority, "if the grave concern for freedom of the press which prompted

255 See Rabban, supra note 14, at 521.
256 See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 174-78 (2018).

257 This was despite the efforts by business groups and others to get the Court to do just that.
See WEINRIB, supra note 26, at 221-22.
258 See id. at 222.
259 326 U.S.1 (1945).
260 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.

261 Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 21-23 (upholding a judicial order that required the AP to "furnish[] [news] to competitors of old members without discrimination," id. at 21, and prohibited it
from preventing members "from furnishing spontaneous news to anyone not a member of the [AP],"

id.).
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adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command that
the government was without power to protect that freedom." 2 6 2 The
following year in Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 2 6 3 the Court held that, although significant constitutional questions would be raised by an interpretation of the postal laws that gave the postmaster general the power
to deny publications entry to the mail merely because she disliked their
content, 264 Congress had broad power to do what it had done, in one
way or another, since 1792265: namely, "encourage the distribution of
periodicals which disseminated 'information of a public character' . . . because it was thought that those publications as a class contributed to the public good." 26 6 The year after that, in United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 267 the Court upheld the Hatch Act26 s against constitutional challenge, even though - in an effort to protect civil service
workers from political coercion, as well as promote the efficiency of the
civil service writ large - the law imposed very significant constraints
on the ability of civil service workers to engage in partisan political activity.269 The result was to embed within the modern First Amendment
this much older body of non-First Amendment free speech law.
Recognizing the second strand of free speech discourse and practice
as part of the broader American system of free expression thus changes
not only our view of the past, but also how we understand the relationship between the past and the present. It suggests that when it comes
to freedom of speech, the past is much less of a foreign country than we
might otherwise suppose. More specifically, it makes clear that it is not
in fact true - as First Amendment scholars often assume - that the
"American system of freedom of expression . . . [only] beg[a]n to emerge

Id. at 20.
263 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
264 Id. at 155-56.
265 Id. at 151.
266 Id. at 154.
267 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
268 5 U.S.C. @@ 7321-7326.
269 United Pub. Workers, 330 U.S. at 102-03. In its decision, the Court emphasized the efficiencypromoting purposes of the Act. Id. at 103. But, as the legislative debates make clear, a central
motivation behind the Hatch Act, like earlier antipatronage laws, was to prevent government workers from imposing "political tribute" on either their subordinates, or those who wished to receive
federal government funds. 84 CONG. REC. gg8 (1939) ("This measure[,] ... the Hatch bill, is an
outgrowth of the scandalous political manipulations of Federal relief appropriations, as well as
intimidation of relief workers during the primary and general elections of 1936 and 1938. . . . [A]
superintendent was tried and convicted . . . for misappropriation of W. P. A. funds, and for levying
political tribute on poor, unfortunate relief workers." (statement of Rep. Taylor)).
262
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as a coherent body of legal principles . . . well into the twentieth century."2 7 O In fact, important elements of the system - the common carrier laws, the worker speech protection laws, the postal subsidies, even
the first journalism shield laws2 1 - had begun to develop in their modern form well before the 1930s and 1940s and would continue to develop
largely unaffected by the revolution that took place in the First
Amendment cases (at least for a while).27 2
Our present body of free speech law is not, in other words, only a
product of the judge-made changes to constitutional doctrine that took
place in the decades after World War I. It is also a product of the much
more extended series of changes to the statutory and common law that
state and federal legislatures and state courts enacted throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and that they would continue to
enact throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This fact has
significant implications, not only for how we understand the historical
evolution of the American system of free expression, but also for how
we understand its contemporary operation.
B. Our PluralisticPresent

-

The fact that the non-First Amendment law of freedom of speech
continues to play an important role in the regulation of speech in the
mass public sphere, in our workplaces, and in many other arenas of
public expression today suggests at least two important, and perhaps
surprising, things about how freedom of speech is interpreted and enforced in the contemporary United States.
L A PartiallyMajoritarianSystem of Free Expression. First, it
suggests that the right to freedom of speech is far more majoritarian in
its operation than we usually recognize. First Amendment scholars frequently refer to freedom of speech as a counter-majoritarian right
even the "most significantly counter-majoritarian right" guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights. 27 3 The Supreme Court, for its part, has reaffirmed

270 David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT. FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 32, 44 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone
eds., 2018).
271 See Dean C. Smith, The Real Story Behind the Nation's First Shield Law: Maryland, 18941897, 19 COMMC'N L. & POLY 3, 5-6 (2014).
272 See infra notes 296-300 and accompanying text for recent developments.
273

FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 40 (1982) (arguing

that the principle of "freedom of speech is by its nature anti-democratic, anti-majoritarian"); Kent

Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH. J. 645, 735 ("Of all the guarantees
of the Bill of Rights, freedom of speech may be the most significantly counter-majoritarian, preventing ruling groups from suppressing antagonistic points of view and protecting unpopular dissi-

dents from the outrages of popular feeling.").
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on multiple occasions the claim it made in West Virginia School Board
v. Barnette274 : namely, that
The very purpose of [the] Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach
of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. One's right to . . . free speech, a free press . . . and
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
27 5
outcome of no elections.

It is certainly true that the right to freedom of speech is a much more
counter-majoritarian right today than it was in the nineteenth century.
The revolution that took place in First Amendment law in the 1930S
and 1940s not only greatly expanded the role that the First Amendment
played in the American system of free expression in general; it also made
the First Amendment much more significantly counter-majoritarian
than it had previously been, by greatly diminishing the role that the
majoritarian institution of the jury played in delimiting the boundaries
of constitutional protection for speech and greatly expanding the role of
the judge.
This does not mean, however, that the right to freedom of speech is
exclusively or even primarily counter-majoritarian. In fact, majoritarian institutions - state and federal legislatures, their agents, the regulatory agencies, popularly elected state courts - continue to play a
tremendously important role in determining the scope of freedom of
speech and association, just as they did in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, even if juries no longer play the important role in the system
that they once did.
Indeed, in many contexts, whether individuals receive any protection
whatsoever for speech and associational rights that the Court itself has
declared to be crucially important to the preservation of democratic values will depend entirely on the decisions that these majoritarian institutions make. This is true, for example, of what the Court in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin276 declared in 1937 to be the "fundamental right" of
workers "to select representatives of their own choosing for collective
bargaining or other mutual protection without restraint or coercion by
their employer."2"7 It is equally true of the "paramount" right of the
public to "have the medium [of radio] function consistently with the ends
and purposes of the First Amendment." 278 It is also true of the right of

274 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
275 Id. at 638; see, e.g., Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 n.28 (2018);

McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 884 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lucas v. FortyFourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964).
276 301 U.S. 1(1937).
277 Id. at 33.
278 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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the democratic citizenry to access information about the government's
activities, which the Court has recognized to be a "structural necessity
in a real democracy." 2 9 In all these cases, whether and to what extent
anyone will actually be able to exercise these rights depends entirely on
the choices that state and federal legislators, or regulatory agencies like
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the FCC, make. 2 0
The fact that these institutions are the only ones that, under current
precedents, have the responsibility to protect these "fundamental" or
"paramount" or "structurally necessary" rights suggests that it is not
quite correct to think of the role that they play in the American system
of free expression as merely additive. Legislatures and state courts do
not (to return to Justice Brennan's metaphor) merely add protection
above a well-built federal constitutional floor. In many contexts, there
is no federal constitutional floor for them to build upon.
Instead, it is more apt to characterize the relationship between majoritarian and counter-majoritarian institutions in our system of free expression as a departmentalist one. Legislatures, agencies, and state and
federal courts sometimes "exercise[] exclusive control over discrete interpretive areas" when it comes to the fashioning of speech rights. 2 1 In
other cases, they "render overlapping and potentially conflicting interpretations on the same subjects" 2 82 - as is true for example when it
comes to the laws that protect government workers' speech and association. The result is a significant body of free speech law that is created
and also enforced by the political branches of the government.
The power that majoritarian institutions possess in our system to
protect speech and associational freedom has clear benefits. As the history of the postal subsidies and the worker-protection laws suggests,
partisan dynamics may lead legislators and other elected officials to be
much more sensitive than life-tenured federal judges to certain kinds of
threats, both to expressive freedom and to democratic values. Allowing
the political branches to interpret freedom of speech differently than the
federal courts may therefore result in more expansive rights protection
than a more purely counter-majoritarian setup would produce. This
279 Nat'l Archives & Recs. Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171-72 (2004).

280 The First Amendment does not provide any protection for the first two sets of rights because
of the state action requirement. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. State action does not
present any problems with the third - but in this context, as in many others, the Court has unequivocally rejected the idea that the First Amendment grants the individual any positive rights.
See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 232 (2013) ("This Court has repeatedly made clear that
there is no constitutional right to obtain all the information provided by FOIA laws."). The result
is that, if Congress were to get rid of FOIA tomorrow or any of the other public records laws that
attempt to ensure that the government is minimally legible to the citizens in whose name it purports
to act, the First Amendment would prove no impediment.
281 David E. Pozen, JudicialElections as Popular Constitutionalism, i1o COLUM. L. REV. 2047,
2063 (2010).
282

Id.
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possibility is particularly likely given the long-standing judicial tendency
to interpret the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment as primarily
negative ones. As the examples of the postal laws or the history of the
Western Union suggest, ensuring the existence of an "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public debate on public matters may sometimes
require positive government action (and a great deal of it).283 We might
think that majoritarian institutions, like legislatures, are both more
likely to compel action of that sort, and more legitimately authorized to
do so than courts. 28 4
And of course, although the federal courts are political creatures in
their own right and, for this and other reasons, are influenced by changing public attitudes and beliefs, there is no question that legislatures are
both more accessible and more responsive to the demands of social
movement actors and ordinary citizens than are the federal
courts. 2 5 A system of free expression that is more majoritarian consequently makes it easier for ordinary citizens to play a role in delimiting
the meaning and scope of free speech rights. We might think this is a
good thing, both because it democratizes the process of rights interpretation and because it forces members of the political community to take
responsibility for ensuring that the democratic principles that our system
of government is supposed to be organized around are in fact meaningfully realized. 2 6 It may encourage, in other words, that attitude of selfreliance that Justice Frankfurter - writing in strong opposition to the
claims of judicial supremacy made by the Barnette majority - argued
is the only reliable way of ensuring an enduring popular commitment to
democratic values. 28 7
There are also, however, obvious downsides to a system of free expression that, like our own, is partially majoritarian. For one thing, it

283 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
284 The idea that the provision of positive rights is a legislative rather than judicial function is
one the Court has articulated on a number of occasions. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58-5g (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
285 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183 (1983) ("Courts are not subject to lobbying,
judges do not entertain visitors in their chambers for the purpose of urging that cases be resolved
one way or another, and they do not and should not respond to parades, picketing, or pressure
groups.").

286 For a democratic argument in favor of a greater role for the political branches in the practice
of constitutional interpretation, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism
and Section Five Power:PolicentricInterpretationof the Family and Medical Leave Act, 11 2 YALE
L.J. 1943, 1945-47 (2003).
287 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 670-71 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("Reliance for the most precious interests of civilization ... must be found outside of their vindication in courts of law. Only a persistent positive translation of the faith of a free society into the
convictions and habits and actions of a community is the ultimate reliance against unabated temptations to fetter the human spirit.").
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grants politically motivated institutions a great deal of power not to protect important expressive interests when it serves their interests not to
do so. More generally, it allows rights that we ordinarily think of as
preconditions of democratic government - rights that the Court described in 1937 as "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly
every other form of freedom" 2 8 - to be controlled, not entirely but in
very significant ways, by the democratic institutions they are supposed
to both enable and constrain. The result is to make these crucial democratic rights much more vulnerable to the machinations of self-interested majorities, and to the popular biases that fuel them, than we would
want in a first-best world.
Like it or loath it, the fact that majoritarian institutions possess in
some cases exclusive power to protect - or not to protect - crucially
important rights of speech and association as they see fit is not only a
long-standing feature of the American system of free expression but also
is not something that is likely to change anytime soon. Certainly, the
Court has given no indication that it intends to constitutionalize private
workers' right to freedom of speech, or the right of the public to information about their government, or any of the other speech rights that
have thus far been left to legislatures and state courts to protect. And
although, as I discuss in Part III, the Court has proven increasingly
willing in recent years to construe the First Amendment ceiling as somewhat lower than it did in previous decades, it has shown no indication
of any desire to deprive legislatures of the power they currently possess
to regulate common carriers, protect workers against employer sanctions, require government actors to provide information to the public,
or regulate speech in many of the other ways they currently do. What
this means is that, both today and in all likelihood for the indefinite
future as well, legal protection for speech and association will depend
not just on the federal courts but also on a much more diverse array of
governmental institutions - many of which are not embedded in the
hierarchical relationships, or governed by the judicial principles, that
help ensure some degree of ideological conformity among the federal
courts. 2 9
This leads us to the second important fact about the modern system
of free expression that a focus solely on the First Amendment cases
threatens to obscure: namely, that like other departmentalist systems of
rights interpretation, it permits different institutions to conceive and operationalize the same right in very different ways. 2 90 Notwithstanding
all the other changes that have occurred in the American system of free
288 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
289 See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46

STAN. L. REV. 817, 826-28 (1994) (describing the doctrine of "hierarchical precedent"); see also
Strauss, supra note 270, at 46-47 (describing the constraints imposed on judges by the common law
principles that continue to inform the process of constitutional interpretation in the federal courts).
290 Pozen, supra note 281, at 2063.
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expression, legislatures, regulatory agencies, and state courts continue to
possess today, just as they did in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
considerable power to protect the expressive and democratic freedom of
members of the political community in ways that the First Amendment
cases do not.
The result is a system of free expression that, notwithstanding the
scope and power of the modern First Amendment, remains as - or even
more - pluralistic in how it conceives freedom of speech and association as it was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Indeed, the
diverse array of statutory, regulatory, and state constitutional laws that
makes up the non-First Amendment law of freedom of speech not only
applies very often to speech contexts in which the First Amendment
does not, but also operates according to principles that are very different
from those that structure the First Amendment cases.
In the next section, I examine some of these differences. What doing
so makes clear is that, although the system of free expression as a whole
looks remarkably different than it did a century ago, there continue to
be, roughly speaking, two strands of discourse and practice that organize
the allocation of speech rights in the United States: the first, a primarily
libertarian strand of free speech law that gains its authority from the
constitutional text; and the second, a nonconstitutional strand that is
much less libertarian, and much more redistributive, in what it understands freedom of speech to mean and to require.
2.

Differing Conceptions of the Right. -

To get a sense of how dif-

ferent the principles that organize, and the normative views that motivate, the non-First Amendment and First Amendment bodies of free
speech law can be, consider two bodies of closely parallel law: the first,
the sizeable collection of local, state, and federal statutes that prohibit
employers from firing, not hiring, and/or discriminating against workers
because of their speech or expressive association canvassed in section
I.C; the second, the First Amendment government employee speech
cases.
These two bodies of law clearly protect many of the same interests.
By preventing employers from using their economic power to coerce or
chill their employees' speech, both protect workers' expressive and associational autonomy. 291 Both also protect, by proxy, the right of the
public to hear what those workers wish to say, and thereby promote the
"unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and

291 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (noting that employment actions motivated by the
employee's political speech or associations, "to the extent [they] compel[] or restrain[] belief and
association, [are] inimical to the process which undergirds our system of government and [are] 'at
war with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amendment"' (quoting Ill. State
Emps. Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 576 ( 7 th Cir. 1972))).
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social changes desired by the people" that the Court has declared it a
central purpose of the First Amendment to guarantee. 2 9 2
The two bodies of law protect these interests, however, in markedly
different ways. The First Amendment cases, for their part, cast a wide
net. They apply to any speech by a government worker that touches on
matters of public concern - a category the Court has defined expansively to include all speech that "can 'be fairly considered as relating to
any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community"' or
that becomes "a subject of legitimate news interest" - so long as that
speech was not made pursuant to the worker's job duties. 29 3 But they
do not immunize all of the speech that falls into this category from employment sanctions. Instead, they extend constitutional protection to
the employee's speech only when a court finds that the worker's interest
in communicating that information to the public, and the public's interest in receiving it, outweighs whatever institutional reasons the employer had for sanctioning it.294 In practice, the significant deference
that courts show toward the institutional prerogatives of government
employers means that employers are frequently permitted to discipline
or fire workers who speak on matters of public concern because they
fear the speech will threaten workplace comity or cast the government

agency in a bad public light. 295
In contrast, the non-First Amendment laws tend to protect a narrower range of speech and expressive conduct. Whistleblower laws, for
example, typically protect employees against employment sanctions only
for speech that reveals a violation of the law, a threat to public safety,
or some other pressing public harm - and in some cases, only when
that speech is uttered to the specified audience. 296 Other local and state

292 Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 236 (2014) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484
(1957)); see id. at 235-36.
293 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (first quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 146
(1983); and then quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004) (per curiam)); see also Garcetti
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417, 421 (2006).
294 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) ("The problem in any [government employee speech] case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.").
295 See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government's Control of Its
Workers' Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 8-20 (2009) (documenting and
criticizing the extent of deference extended to government employers by the government employee
speech cases).
296 The NLRA, for example, prohibits employers from discharging or discriminating against employees who give testimony to the NLRB. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4). The Civil Service Reform Act,
meanwhile, makes it unlawful for federal government employers to discipline workers who disclose
information they reasonably believe "evidences . . . violation of any law, rule, or regulation;
or . . . gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and
specific danger to public health or safety." 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(D). For detailed examination of
the state laws, see generally Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 216.
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laws protect only workers' political speech, or specified kinds of politically expressive acts, such as voting, or running for public office, or contributing to a political campaign. 297 State and federal labor laws, meanwhile, protect only worker speech that constitutes concerted activity
speech that encourages or otherwise enables workers to act together "for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 298
These laws tend to apply to a broader range of workplaces than the
First Amendment cases, however. Many protect not just government
workers but private-sector workers as well. 299 Others protect only private-sector workers, but in those cases, these laws are frequently
matched with a complementary law that provides similar protection to
government workers. 300
Perhaps because they apply to a narrower range of speech acts, these
laws also tend to provide much more unequivocal protection to the
speech they do protect than the First Amendment cases do. Rather than
balancing the rights of the worker against the interests of the employer,
many absolutely prohibit employers from firing or otherwise disciplining
workers for engaging in statutorily protected speech, even when they
have a good institutional reason to do so. This is certainly true of the
many whistleblower laws that provide virtually absolute protection to
workers who disclose statutorily protected kinds of information in the
right kind of way.30 1 But it is also true of many of the laws that protect
workers' political expression. In Louisiana, for example, a state court
of appeals held that a corporation that fired an employee who chose to
run for a seat on the city council violated the state law that made it a
crime for any employer that regularly employed twenty or more employees to "make, adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy forbidding
or preventing any of his employees from . . . becoming a candidate for
public office" 302 even though the company had reason to fear that the

297

See infra notes

302-305

and accompanying text.

298 29 U.S.C. § 157; see, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1152 (West 2021); FLA. STAT. § 447.301(3)
(2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.03 (West 2021).

299 This is true of many of the local and state statutes that protect workers against employer
sanctions motivated by their political speech. See Volokh, supra note 35, at 313-25.
300 In many states, for example, public-sector workers receive roughly parallel protection for their
concerted activity and association under state law that private-sector workers receive under the
NLRA and complementary state statutes. See id. Indeed, the language used in these laws frequently mirrors that in the NLRA. See, e.g., infra note 343 and accompanying text.
301 Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 216, at 119-23 (discussing the often-expansive judicial interpretation of these laws). Professors Elletta Sangrey Callahan and Terry Morehead Dworkin
note that courts disagree about whether employees are protected when they mistakenly report that
their employers engaged in the prohibited practices. Id. at 121-22. But as their article makes clear,
the issue in these cases is always whether the statute applies, not whether the employees' right to
speak outweighs the employer's right to prevent them.
302 Davis v. La. Computing Corp., 394 So. 2d 678, 679 n.i (La. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting LA. STAT.
ANN. § 23:961 (2020)).
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"plaintiff's candidacy would antagonize persons who could withdraw
business from plaintiff's employer."3 0 3 Although the court found this to
be a valid business justification for the firing, it concluded that the statutory text was clear: employers simply could not sanction workers in
any way for their decision to run for public office. 30 4 Similarly unequivocal language can be found in dozens of other laws that make it unlawful for employers to fire or otherwise discriminate against workers for
their political expression, broadly or narrowly construed.30 5
These differences in how the two regimes of speech protection operate can be explained by the different pragmatic judgments that the legislators and judges who fashioned them made when doing so, and by
their different institutional roles. The fact that the First Amendment
cases apply a very open-ended standard to determine whether the
worker's speech is protected, whereas many of the non-First
Amendment laws apply something much closer to a rule, may reflect,
for example, a difference of opinion about the institutional capacities of
courts versus legislatures - and specifically, whether it is better to empower courts to determine the scope of protection for workers' speech
ex post, on a case-by-case basis (as the First Amendment cases do), or
for the legislature to establish a firmer, clearer, but inevitably narrower,
rule in advance.
Similarly, the fact that many of the non-First Amendment laws protect the speech and association of private-sector workers, while the First
Amendment cases do not, can be explained by the different kinds of
power that the legislators and judges who crafted these laws exercised
when they did so - and specifically, the fact that the First Amendment
cases exercise a power that has been interpreted to constrain only government actors, whereas the non-First Amendment laws rely upon instruments of legal power (state police power or the Federal Commerce
Clause) that have not been found to be so limited in their reach.3 0 6
Some of the other differences in how these two regimes of speech
protection operate do reflect, however, a difference of opinion about the
relative value that different kinds of speech possess and, more generally,
about the scope of the government's responsibility in a democratic society to protect the expressive autonomy of its citizens and subjects.
Consider for example the choice that so many local and state legislatures

303 Id. at 679.
304 Id.
305 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE
CODE ANN.

§

§

110o

(West 2021); N.C. GEN. STAT.

§

163-274 (2014); TENN.

(West 2021). See generally Volokh, supra note 35, at 299-301 (noting the
sweeping reach of many of these laws).
306 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (recognizing the Commerce Clause as a broad
constraint on private action); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (recognizing that states possess broad power to police the actions of private persons).
2-19-134
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have made to extend statutory protection only to employees' explicitly
political speech. Because there is no reason to think that speech of this
kind poses any less of a threat to employers' institutional interests than
any other kind of speech - indeed, the Louisiana case discussed above
suggests how damaging employees' public political activities can sometimes be to the interests of their employers 307 - the choice to protect,
but to protect only, political speech appears to reflect an implicit legislative judgment that this kind of speech is more valuable than other
kinds of speech. One might in fact interpret the narrower but stronger
protection that many of these laws provide to workers' political expression to reflect the view that this kind of expression is so important to
democratic government that it is better to concentrate all regulatory and
enforcement resources on its protection than to dilute these resources by
providing weaker protection to a much wider range of speech, as the
First Amendment cases do.
Either way, it is difficult to interpret these laws as anything but an
implicit repudiation of what has emerged as one of the most distinctive,
if controversial, organizing principles of the modern First Amendment
cases. This is the principle that all speech that touches on matters of
public concern possesses equal constitutional value, even when it discusses seemingly unimportant topics (celebrity gossip, sports, popular
music, poetry), because anything that is of interest to the public has the
ability to influence public attitudes and beliefs and therefore contributes
to the process of democratic self-fashioning that the First Amendment
protects from government control. 3 0 Professor Robert Bork famously
argued that the Court's insistence on extending equal amounts of constitutional protection to overtly nonpolitical and explicitly political
speech reflected a ridiculously broad conception of the First
Amendment's democratic purposes and that constitutional protection
should instead extend only to speech that explicitly addresses public policy or other governmental matters. 309 This argument never convinced
the Court, which continued to insist long after Bork made his argument
that "speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is
the essence of self-government."3 1 0 But it is the view that legislatures in
Arizona, California, Guam, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Urbana307 In the Louisiana case, the employer credibly believed that its employee's decision to run
against a member of the city council might endanger its relationship with the government agency
that provided it sixty percent of its business. Davis, 394 So. 2d at 679.
308 Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) ("The Free Speech Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public matters, but we have long recognized that it is difficult to
distinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try."); see also United States v. Playboy
Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
309 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
20-31

(1971).

310 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75
(1964)).
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Champaign, Wyoming, and many other states and localities appear to
hold. Certainly, what legislators in these jurisdictions have produced is
a regime of speech protection that in practice values explicitly political
speech more than other kinds, and that makes as a result the kinds of
subject-matter distinctions - in particular, the distinction between political and nonpolitical speech - that the Court in its First Amendment
cases has long disavowed.
A similar story can be told about the various state and federal labor
laws that protect the right of private-sector workers to collectively organize at work. In this case also, the legislative decision to extend protection to certain kinds of speech - in particular, the decision to protect
the right of workers to speak as they desire during collective bargaining
or other acts of collective organizing - reflects a very different view of
what kinds of speech possess democratic value than the view that informs the First Amendment cases.
Specifically, it reflects the view that guaranteeing the democratic nature of the American state and society requires not only that members
of the political community have a say in the rules that govern society
writ large, but also that they have a say in the rules that govern their
private working lives. As I noted in Part I, this was an idea of democracy that labor groups like the Knights of Labor and the AFL
strenuously advocated for in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 3 1 1 It was also an idea of democracy that shaped how early twentieth-century labor laws like the NLRA were structured and that
supporters invoked to justify their necessity.3 12
But it is not an idea of democracy that the Court ever endorsed.
Although in Jones & Laughlin the Court recognized that workers have
a fundamental right to collectively organize and engage in other acts of
"mutual protection" at work, it never suggested that this right was democratically significant. 3 1 3 And certainly, in its government employee
speech cases, the Court has interpreted the democratic significance of
employee speech to be solely its capacity to inform the public about

311 See supra note 210 and accompanying text.

312 For discussion of the role that ideals of industrial democracy played in legislative debates
about the NLRA and other early twentieth-century labor laws, see Karl E. Klare, Judicial
Deradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62
MINN. L. REV. 265, 284-93 (1978); and Ruth Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45
COLUM. L. REV. 556, 562 (194).
313 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937). In that decision, the Court did
acknowledge that guaranteeing the right of workers to collectively organize was necessary to protect
their autonomy in the workplace. See id. But the argument it made for why worker autonomy
mattered concerned economic necessity, not democratic legitimacy; it sounded in the register of
freedom of contract rather than freedom of speech. Id. (explaining that labor unions were "organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was helpless in dealing with an
employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and
family").
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public matters. 314 This is the reason it has denied protection to employees who are disciplined for speech that affects purely internal workplace
matters, no matter how important that speech may be to the negotiation
of the relationship between employer and employee. 315
The result is a marked difference in the scope of protection provided
to worker speech by the First Amendment and by state and federal labor
laws like the NLRA. Although labor speech does sometimes enjoy First
Amendment protection, it does so only when courts find it addresses
matters of public concern. 316 In contrast, state and federal labor laws
provide workplace speech significant protection even when it deals with
only internal workplace matters. The NLRB has concluded, for example, that workers can be disciplined for speech they utter while engaged
in concerted activity only when it is so "flagrant, violent, or extreme"
that it reveals the employee to be "unfit for further service," because to
allow employers to freely sanction workers engaged in acts of collective
advocacy would undermine the fundamental equality between workers
and employers that the labor laws are supposed to guarantee. 317 The
old idea of industrial democracy continues to live on, in other words, in
the everyday regulation of workplace speech under the NLRA; but it
does not inform, and never has informed, how the courts conceive the
First Amendment's democratic purposes.
As these examples demonstrate, once one begins to look at the nonFirst Amendment laws of freedom of speech, what one finds are all
kinds of differences from the First Amendment cases in the assumptions
they make and, consequently, the scope and nature of the legal protection they provide. The worker speech protection laws are not, in this
respect, at all unique. Although it is impossible to say anything general

314 See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (explaining that the First Amendment
"play[s a] role in government employment decisions [because] ... public debate may gain much
from the[] informed opinions [of government employees a]nd a government employee, like any citizen, may have a strong, legitimate interest in speaking out on public matters" (citation omitted)).
315 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) ("When employee expression cannot be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by
the judiciary. . . ."); Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Loc. 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464 (1979) (per
curiam) ("[T]he First Amendment is not a substitute for the national labor relations laws.... [T]he
fact that procedures followed by a public employer in bypassing the union and dealing directly with
its members might well be unfair labor practices were federal statutory law applicable hardly establishes that such procedures violate the Constitution.").
316 Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 636 (2014) (concluding that the speech involved in publicsector collective bargaining touches on matters of public concern, whereas the speech involved in
private-sector collective bargaining does not because "[i]n the public sector, core issues such as
wages, pensions, and benefits are important political issues, but that is generally not so in the private

sector").
317 United Cable Television Corp., 299 N.L.R.B. 138, 142 (1990); see also, e.g., Am. Red Cross
Blood Servs., 316 N.L.R.B. 783, 787-88 (1995); Hawaiian Hauling Serv., Ltd., 219 N.L.R.B. 765,
766 (1975).
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about all of the laws that protect First Amendment interests by nonFirst Amendment means, there are at least three very significant ways
in which many of these laws differ in their operation from the First
Amendment cases - differences that in turn point to underlying differences in what lawmakers understand freedom of speech in a democratic
society to require.
(a) Freedom of Speech in the Private Sphere. - First, as should be
quite obvious by now, many of the non-First Amendment laws that
protect the right of the public to access uncensored "channels of communication," 318 or that protect the right of speakers to take part in "free
political discussion," 31 9 protect those rights against private as well as, or
instead of, state action. Not only the worker speech protection laws
discussed earlier, but also the common carrier and quasi-common carrier laws, the many "anti-SLAPP" laws that protect freedom of speech
against vexatious private litigation, education laws like California's
Leonard Law,3 2 0 the various state constitutional free expression guarantees that have been interpreted to grant speakers rights against private
actors - all these laws, and many like them, protect freedom of speech
and association in the private sphere. 3 21
As I noted in the previous section, the fact that these non-First
Amendment free speech laws protect against private action, whereas the
First Amendment cases almost never do, does not necessarily tell us anything about how the different lawmakers responsible for fashioning
them conceived the right to freedom of speech. Instead, it may reveal
only what they understood to be the nature and scope of their legal
authority.
It might, however, reveal more than that. This is because, in recent
years, the Court has suggested that the strict state action requirement it
applies in First Amendment cases should not be thought of merely as an
external limit on the First Amendment's reach; that it is instead an important mechanism by which the First Amendment safeguards freedom
of speech. The Court recently argued as much, for example, to explain
why a nonprofit corporation that had been set up by the local government to operate the public access channel that state law required cable
companies to provide could not be considered a state actor for First
Amendment purposes, even though it not only performed a governmentmandated service but was also prevented by state law from exercising
any editorial discretion when it did so. 3 2 2 Maintaining a strict boundary
between state and private actors, the Court asserted, was necessary to
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946).
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
320 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 2020).
318

319

321 See supra notes 229-233 and accompanying text.
322 See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019).
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preserve the existence of a "robust sphere of individual liberty" in which
private persons are free to make expressive choices for themselves. 3 2 3
Imposing constitutional duties on private actors like the nonprofit corporation, the Court warned, would result in a less vibrant marketplace
of ideas by depriving private property owners of the ability "to exercise
what they deem to be appropriate editorial discretion" over the property
that they own.

324

First Amendment scholars have made similar arguments to defend
the current version of the state action doctrine. Professor Frederick
Schauer, for example, has described the state action requirement as
"[t]he touchstone of the negative theory of the [F]irst [A]mendment." 3 25
"[B]y establishing limits on the reach of [the] constitutional prohibitions," Schauer argues, the requirement "leaves private persons free to
'discriminate' against the speech and speech-related activities of others
in ways that are forbidden to the government." 3 2 6 This is vitally important, he claims, because it is by means of this kind of private content
discrimination that the marketplace of ideas functions to sort the good
ideas from the bad.327 By ensuring that private persons are free to "prefer[] some ideas and information to others" and to "plac[e their] property
at the service of some ideologies and not others," 3 28 Schauer argues, the
state action requirement "protect[s] an element of [F]irst [A]mendment
freedom [that is] as important as the right to speak." 3 2 9
This view of the state action doctrine's function is very difficult to
reconcile with the Court's willingness to permit local, state, and federal
legislatures to intrude as greatly as they do on the "individual sphere of
liberty" that the state action doctrine is purported to protect.3 3 0 But
even if it is a view of freedom of speech that motivates the First
Amendment state action decisions, it is certainly not a view of freedom
of speech that motivates the many non-First Amendment laws of freedom of speech that protect speech and associational freedom against
private action. As Part I makes clear, these laws instead reflect the view
that legal restrictions on the freedom of private persons to "prefer[] some
ideas and information to others" are not always a threat to the vibrancy
of the marketplace of ideas but, to the contrary, can provide an important means of safeguarding it in a context in which private actors
323 Id. at 1928.
324 Id. at 1931; see id. at 1930-31.
325 Frederick F. Schauer, Hudgens v.

N.L.R.B. and the Problem of State Action in First
Amendment Adjudication, 61 MINN. L. REV. 433, 443 (1977).
326 Id.
327 Id. at 449.
328 Id.
329 Id. at 451.

330 For a more extended version of this argument, see Genevieve Lakier, Manhattan Community
Access Corp. v. Halleck: Property Wins Out over Speech on the Supposedly Free-Speech Court,
2018-2019 AM. CONST. SOC'Y SUP. CT. REV.
125, https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/10/ACS-Supreme-Court-Review-2018-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/67L6-FMYU].
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possess significant power not just to disseminate their own message but
also to control the messages that others disseminate.
The result is what can be described without much overstatement as
a radically different geography of speech protection than the one the
First Amendment cases create: one that not only penetrates much further into the private sphere than the First Amendment ever has but that
also, consequently, distinguishes between those who possess speech
rights and those who possess speech-facilitating duties not by making
the blunt, formal distinction between state and private actors that the
First Amendment cases make but by making more fine-grained and
functional distinctions by distinguishing between, for example, private
employers and private employees, private school administrators and students, private radio broadcasters and political candidates, and the like.
And the result of that is a body of law that also continues to be, just as
it was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, much more redistributive in its conception of freedom of speech than the First Amendment
cases are, both when it comes to the duties it imposes on government
actors and when it comes to the duties it imposes on private actors in
the name of freedom of speech.
(b) A Redistributive Notion of Freedom of Speech. - For over four
decades now, the Court has insisted that the "concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment." 33 1 It has construed the First Amendment, in other words,
to never require, and to only rarely permit, laws that attempt to equalize
expressive opportunity. Laws that constrain the expressive freedom of
particularly powerful speakers, so that less powerful speakers can be
heard, the Court has argued, are anathema to the First Amendment,
which was "designed 'to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources'" and "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people" - to increase speech, in other words, not
limit it.332

Even when it comes to government actors, the Court has largely resisted the idea that the First Amendment requires limiting their expressive freedom in order to "enhance the relative voice of others." This
explains, among other things, the Court's conclusion that government
employees lack any First Amendment protection for speech they utter
pursuant to their job duties, even when that speech touches on matters

331 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). The Court first stated as much in Buckley, but
has repeated the claim on many occasions since. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 207
(2014); Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 741 (2011).
332 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269 (1964)).
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of public concern. 333 Because speech government employees utter pursuant to their job duties is speech the government paid them to produce,
a contrary conclusion would interfere with the government's ability to
control its own property - and by proxy, the message it sends to the
public. 33 4 "[W]hen the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own," the Court noted in Garcetti v.
Ceballos335 in 2006, "it is entitled to say what it wishes." 336
The Court's hostility to laws that attempt to equalize expressive opportunity has produced a very antiredistributive body of First
Amendment law.
Although the Court has interpreted the First
Amendment in some circumstances to require that the government grant
access to its property to speakers and viewpoints it dislikes, it has strictly
circumscribed the class of cases in which the government is prevented
from placing its property at the service of some ideologies and not others. 33 7 Private persons, meanwhile, are virtually never required by current First Amendment rules to grant the use of their property to speakers
or viewpoints they dislike, or to otherwise facilitate the speech of others. 3 38 They also enjoy full constitutional protection when they use their
voice to coerce or threaten others into speaking or not speaking a particular way, so long as they do not do so by seriously threatening "to
commit an act of unlawful violence." 33 9
This antiredistributive view of the freedom of speech guaranteed by
the First Amendment stands in sharp contrast to the view of freedom of

333 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).
334 Id. at 421-22.

335 547 U.S. 410.
336 Id. at 422 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (alteration in original));
see also Norton, supra note 295, at 12 ("[Garcetti]created a bright-line rule that treats public employees' speech delivered pursuant to their official duties as the government's own speech - that
is, speech that the government has bought with a salary and thus may control free from First
Amendment scrutiny.").
337 The only class of cases in which the government is required to allow speakers onto its property
are those involving "quintessential" public forums that have historically been used for expressive
purposes - parks, roads, sidewalks. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Loc. Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). If the government chooses to open its property up to speech, it may not also
exclude speakers because of their viewpoints, but it may establish reasonable limits on the kinds of
speakers who may speak and the subjects they may speak about. Id. at 46. With respect to all
other kinds of government property, the First Amendment treats government owners more or less
like private owners, with full power to exclude. See id.
338 Only if a private property owner is found to exercise a function "traditionally exclusively
reserved to the State," Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019)

(quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)), or if it is effectively controlled by
government agencies or peopled by government officials operating in their official capacity, see, e.g.,
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 290-91 (2001), may it be

required to open its property to outside speakers. The class of cases in which these standards are
met is likely to be exceedingly small. See generally Lakier, supra note 330.
339 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003) (defining the category of threats that may constitutionally be prohibited because of their content).
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speech implicit in many of the non-First Amendment free speech laws.
Consider once again the many local, state, and federal laws that protect
private-sector workers' freedom of speech. All of these laws interfere
with the ability of private persons to place their property at the service
of some ideologies but not others by limiting their ability to discipline,
fire, or not hire the workers whose wages they are paying, or will in the
future pay. And some of these laws impose much greater constraints on
employers' property rights. The NLRA, for example, requires employers to allow employees the use of their property for organizing purposes
while not at work, and to grant some degree of access to nonemployee
union organizers as well, although how much access has proved to be,
and remains, a highly contested question. 340
The California
Agricultural Relations Act 4 1 (CARA) similarly requires agricultural employers to allow union representatives onto their property for the purpose of meeting and talking with employees 120 days out of every calendar year.342

Nor is it only property rights that these laws redistribute. Many of
these laws also redistribute expressive opportunity by imposing sometimes very significant content-based constraints on what employers may
say to their employees, in order to ensure that workers feel free to speak
as they wish. Both the NLRA and the CARA, for example, make it
unlawful for employers to tell workers that if they vote to join a union
they will suffer economic repercussions, unless the employer has information that these repercussions are a "demonstrably probable consequence[] beyond [the employer's] control." 34 3 Employers also may not
"denigrate the Union" or "threaten[] employees that they might lose their
jobs if they [go] on strike" or engage in similar kinds of anti-union
speech.344 Similar restrictions are imposed on public employers by
many state labor laws. 3 45
Meanwhile, private as well as public employers are prohibited in
many states from engaging in speech that has a coercive effect on their
workers' political expression. In California, for example, neither public
340 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV.
305, 306-07 (1994). For recent developments, see Bexar Cnty. Performing Arts Ctr. Found., 368
N.L.R.B. 46 (2019); and MCNICHOLAS, POYDOCK & RHINEHART, supra note 228, at 5-1o.
341 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 20900 (2021).

342 Id. The Ninth Circuit recently rejected a takings challenge to this requirement. Cedar Point
Nursery v. Shiroma, 923 F.3 d 524, 533 (9 th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Cedar Point Nursery
v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 844 (2020); id. at 538 (Leavy, J., dissenting).
343 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969); see also Merrill Farms v. Agric. Lab.
Rels. Bd., 169 Cal. Rptr. 774, 777 (Ct. App. 1980).
344 Ingredion, Inc., 366 N.L.R.B. 74 (2018); see also Harry Carian Sales v. Agric. Lab. Rels. Bd.,
703 P.2d 27, 49 (Cal. 1985).
345 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3506.5 (West 2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1307 (West
2021); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW
2021).

§

209-a (McKinney 2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§

4117.11 (West
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nor private employers may "attempt to coerce or influence . . . employees . . . by means of threat of discharge or loss of employment to adopt
or follow or refrain from adopting or following any particular course or
line of political action or political activity." 34 6 In more than a dozen
states, meanwhile, employers are prohibited from "exhibit[ing] in the
[workplace] any handbill or placard containing any threat, notice, or
information that if any particular candidate is elected or defeated, work
in the establishment will cease in whole or in part," 34 7 or from making
any "other threats expressed or implied, intended to influence the political opinions or votes of [their] employees." 34 8 The result is dozens upon
dozens of laws that restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the
speech of others.
These are by no means the only non-First Amendment free speech
laws that operate in this way to redistribute expressive opportunity. The
same is true of the common carrier and quasi-common carrier laws, and
many of the other laws discussed in the previous Part.
This is not to say that non-First Amendment free speech laws always
operate in a redistributive manner. Sometimes they do just the opposite.
This is true, for example, of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act
of 1996,349 which works to promote freedom of speech on social media
platforms by immunizing the powerful companies that control them
from civil liability for their decision to keep speech on the platform or
take it down.3 5 0 The result is to reinforce the power that the social media companies already possess over those who use the platform to speak.
It is nevertheless true that the redistribution of property and speech
rights from some (private or government persons) to other private persons is a regular - even, one might say, a pervasive - characteristic of
the non-First Amendment body of free speech law.
This fact reflects the very different presumptions that tend to motivate this body of law, when compared to the First Amendment cases.
The modern First Amendment cases clearly presume that laws that
mandate the redistribution of expressive opportunities not only are not
required by, but actively endanger, the democratic and expressive freedom that the First Amendment protects. The redistributive non-First
Amendment laws, in contrast, reflect the view that in some circumstances - in particular, when the existing regime of property rights and
modes of economic production imperil the robust and inclusive public
debate that democratic government depends on - the redistribution of

346

CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 2021).

25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3547 (West 2021).
348 Volokh, supra note 35, at 318 n.103; see id. at 334-37 (listing states).
349 47 U.S.C § 230.
350 Id.
347
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both speech and property rights is in fact necessary to vindicate both
expressive and democratic liberty.
Whether First Amendment law should also operate according to
these presumptions has been a vigorous topic of debate among scholars
for decades now. 351
Proponents of a more redistributive First
Amendment have made little headway with the Court, however. But,
as the history in Part I makes clear, the belief in the necessity of speech
redistribution has always motivated the non-First Amendment free
speech tradition, and continues to motivate its expansion today. The
result is a rich body of nonconstitutional law that, although it attempts
to protect many of the same interests that the First Amendment cases
protect, frequently does so by means that are "wholly foreign to the First
Amendment," 35 2 as it is currently understood.
(c) Content- and Speaker-Based Discrimination.- Finally, perhaps
because they do require so much more of the private persons who are
the targets of their regulation, many of the laws described above tend to
draw much finer distinctions between protected and unprotected speech
than the First Amendment cases draw. It is not only the worker speech
protection laws that apply to a much narrower range of speech than the
First Amendment cases apply to. The same is true of virtually all the
quasi-common carrier laws discussed in section I.B. Often, these laws
require regulators to draw in fact rather minute distinctions between
different kinds of speech acts to determine whether they fall within the
statute's protection.
Consider once again § 315 of the Communications Act. The law,
recall, requires radio and television broadcasters to provide equal opportunities for the "use" of their station to all "legally qualified candidate[s] for any public office" but not to anyone else.3 5 3 In 1952, its reach
was also limited, so that today it does not apply to "bona fide newscast[s]" or "bona fide news interview[s]" or "bona fide news documentar[ies] (if [but only if] the appearance of the candidate is incidental to
the . . . subjects covered by the news documentary)."3 5 4 As should be
apparent from just reading the statutory text, the law requires regulators
to make all kinds of content- and speaker-based distinctions when applying it. Regulators have to decide who counts as a legally qualified
candidate for public office, what counts as a use, and what it means for

351 See, e.g., OWEN FIss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED (1996); Burt Neuborne, Blues for the Left
Hand: A Critique of Cass Sunstein's Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 423, 425-26 (1995); Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic
Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CALIE L. REV. 267,
278-79 (19g1).
352 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976).
353 47 U.S.C. § 315(a).
354 Id.
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a news interview to be "bona fide." The FCC has exercised that authority to decree (among other things) that the airing of a Hollywood movie
in which a candidate for public office appears triggers the equal opportunities provision, as does the broadcast of a drawing of her face.355 But
an interview on the morning talk show "The Today Show" does not,
although an interview on the evening talk show "The Tonight Show"
does.356
Examples of this kind could be multiplied. But the point is plain:
because in a redistributive regime of speech regulation, it is often not
possible or politically feasible for speech or access rights that apply to
some group of speakers to apply to all, the many non-First Amendment
free speech laws that require this kind of redistribution frequently make
the kinds of subject-matter and speaker-based distinctions that the
Court has insisted in recent years should be considered presumptively
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 357 They grant government regulators, in other words, significant power to "disfavor certain
subjects or viewpoints" and "distinguish[] among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others."358
Again, not all of the non-First Amendment free speech laws discussed above make these kinds of content and/or speaker distinctions.
The Connecticut Free Speech Act, for example, applies just as broadly
as the First Amendment does - in fact more broadly.35 9 The same is
true of the Leonard Law.36 0 Meanwhile, state and federal common carrier laws extend protection to almost as much speech as the First
1
Amendment does. 36
But many of the laws discussed above do restrict the scope of their
application by making distinctions based on the identity of the speaker,
or the subject matter of the speech. Although almost none of these laws
rely upon viewpoint distinctions to delimit the scope of their application,
all clearly reflect the view that certain kinds of speech and/or certain
kinds of speakers are more entitled to legal protection than others are,
because of their importance to democratic government or to the operation of the democratic public sphere.
In this respect, as well, what we find when we look at the non-First
Amendment body of free speech law is a very different view of what

355 Primer on Pol. Broad., i00 F.C.C.2d 1476, 1491-92 (1984).
356 Id. at 1494-95.
3s7 See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163-64, 170 (2015).
358 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
359 See sources cited supra notes 221-223 and accompanying text.
360 Eule & Varat, supra note 9, at 1593-94 (noting that the law provides more protection to student speech than the First Amendment school-speech cases do).
361 Although the general presumption that courts apply when they interpret these laws is that
content-based discrimination by common carriers is impermissible, courts have permitted common
carriers to refuse to transmit sexually salacious speech and other kinds of "smut," even though this
kind of speech is constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Carlin Commc'ns, Inc. v. Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1293-94 (9 th Cir. 1987).
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freedom of speech in a democratic society means and requires: one that
is much less committed to the principles of content- and value-neutrality
than the First Amendment cases are. What we find, in other words, is
not just another body of free speech law, but a meaningfully distinct
in some ways startlingly foreign - free speech tradition.
III. RECONCILING THE TWO TRADITIONS

The fact that great swaths of non-First Amendment free speech law
(1) protect speech rights that the First Amendment cases do not, (2) by
making the kinds of content-based and speaker-based distinctions, and
(3) engaging in the kinds of speech redistribution that the First
Amendment cases disavow makes evident how pluralistic the American
system of free expression is and has always been. This pluralism has
implications not only for how we think about free speech in the United
States, but also for how we think about the First Amendment.
This is because, as I noted in the previous Part, however "wholly
foreign" to the principles of the contemporary First Amendment many
of the non-First Amendment free speech laws appear to be, their continued force depends on the actions the Court has taken, or failed to
take, in its capacity as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional meaning.
The Court has, in other words, made it possible for the interventionist
and often redistributive non-First Amendment free speech tradition to
continue to exist - and in some respects, to grow and prosper - notwithstanding the increasingly libertarian and antiredistributive view of
freedom of speech the Court has adopted in its First Amendment cases.
It has not always done so easily. In fact, the Court has struggled a
great deal to come up with explanations for why the laissez-faire principles that govern its interpretation of the First Amendment do not
automatically invalidate the many, sometimes very significant, redistributive laws that populate the regulatory landscape. And the explanations
it has come up with are far from satisfying.
Consider, for example, the argument the Court has made to explain
why the quasi-common carrier obligations that the Communications
Act imposes on radio and television broadcasters are constitutionally
permissible. In a series of cases, it has argued that these regulations are
permissible, notwithstanding the constraints they impose on the expressive freedom of radio and television broadcasters, because they regulate
the use of a communications technology - namely broadcast radio (and
by implication, broadcast television) - that is uniquely scarce. In theory, every person in the United States could publish their own newspaper. But the physics of the radio spectrum mean that not everyone can
control a dedicated frequency. The fact that "radio inherently is not
available to all" led the Court to conclude, in NBC v. United States36 2

362 Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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in 1943, that, "unlike other modes of expression, it [could be] subject to
governmental regulation" and to uphold on that basis FCC regulations
that, among other things, restricted the ability of radio broadcasters to
contractually agree to provide exclusive content from only one
network. 363
Two decades later, in Red Lion v. FCC, the Court again argued that
it was because radio was a uniquely scarce technology of communication
that the significant constraints the fairness doctrine imposed on the editorial autonomy of radio broadcasters were constitutional. 3 6 4 Because
"only a tiny fraction of those with resources and intelligence can hope
to communicate by radio at the same time if intelligible communication
is to be had," the Court argued, "it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." 365 In the face of spectrum scarcity, the
Court insisted, the ordinary, antiredistributive First Amendment rules
must give way.
As numerous scholars have pointed out, the arguments the Court
made in these cases for the constitutional specialness of radio and television broadcasting are completely unconvincing - even perhaps embarrassing.366 It may have been true historically, and may also be true
today, that significantly more people wish to obtain federal broadcast
licenses than there are broadcast licenses available, but the same is also
true of many other mass media technologies. Printing presses may be
more plentiful than individual radio frequencies, but market conditions
can't support all the newspapers people may want to operate. 367 The
same is true of books, internet platforms, and all other commodified
technologies of communication. Scarcity, one might say, is a pervasive
condition of the market. 368 It is not, therefore, a meaningful basis on

363 Id. at 226.

364 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969).
365 Id. at 388.
366 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 89 (1991) (noting that "there is a devastating - even embarrassing - deficiency in [the Red Lion] analysis"); Thomas W. Hazlett, Sarah
Oh & Drew Clark, The Overly Active Corpse of Red Lion, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 51, 51
(2010) ("The logic of Red Lion ... has been widely acknowledged as fatally flawed for a generation."); Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First
Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 271 (2003) (criticizing the lack of "analytical coherence" of the scarcity argument).
367 It is also true, as Professor Thomas Hazlett, Sarah Oh, and Drew Clark note, that there is

"literally no limit to the number of 'broadcast frequencies' [that may be created by] the creation of
joint ownership interests in a license." Hazlett et al., supra note 366, at 54-55.
368 As Ronald Coase noted in 1959:
[I]t is a commonplace of economics that almost all resources used in the economic system
(and not simply radio and television frequencies) are limited in amount and scarce, in that
people would like to use more than exists. Land, labor, and capital are all scarce, but this,
of itself, does not call for government regulation.
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which to justify regulating radio any differently than any other communication technology.
The Court itself has acknowledged as much, more or less. In FCC
v. League of Women Voters,3 6 9 it noted that the "prevailing rationale for
broadcast regulation based on spectrum scarcity has come under increasing criticism in recent years."37 0 The Court nevertheless declined
to "reconsider [its] longstanding approach without some signal from
Congress or the FCC that . .. some revision of the system of broadcast
regulation may be required." 3 1 Unable to come up with a more convincing justification for why the constitutional rules that apply to laws
that regulate radio and television broadcasting are different than those
that apply to newspapers and books - and clearly unwilling to deny
Congress and the FCC the power to regulate broadcasting in the ways
they had traditionally done so - the Court continued to cling to an
argument that even its members appeared to find outdated.37 2 The scarcity argument remains, consequently, one of the primary doctrinal justifications for the quasi-common carrier requirements imposed on
broadcasters by laws like the Communications Act, even though it has
no grounding in empirical reality. Nor is it unique in this respect.
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,3 13 the Court made a
similarly technology-specific, and similarly unpersuasive, argument to
explain why the provisions in the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act3 7 4 that required cable television providers to devote a certain number of their channels to the retransmission of local
broadcast television programming were constitutionally permissible.37 5
The Court argued that the so-called "must-carry provisions" were constitutional, even though they clearly interfered with the editorial autonomy of private cable companies, because the physical characteristics of
cable television specifically, the fact that it was transmitted via a
Coase, supra note 97, at 14. In fact, in 1969, when Red Lion was decided, radio stations were a
good deal less scarce than viable newspaper businesses. Brief for Petitioners at 35, Red Lion, 395
U.S. 367 (No. 717) (reporting census findings that as of 1967, there were "6253 commercial radio
and television stations in the United States, compared to only 1754 daily newspapers, a ratio of
better than 31/2 to I").
369 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
370 Id. at 376 n.io.
371 Id. at 377 n.11.
372 Six years after League of Women Voters, the Court again relied upon the scarcity rationale to
justify broadcast regulation. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566-67 (199o) ("We have
long recognized that '[b]ecause of the scarcity of [electromagnetic] frequencies, the Government is
permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this
unique medium."' (alterations in original) (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390)).
373 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
374 Pub. L. No. 102-385, 1o6 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
375 Turner, 520 U.S. at 185 (upholding the provisions); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 657 (1994) (determining the standard of review).
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cable that the cable provider owned and controlled - gave cable providers a power that other media companies did not possess.3 7 6 The fact
that cable companies controlled the cable that their customers used to
watch not only their programming but also the programming of their
competitors, the Court asserted, meant that "cable operator[s], unlike
speakers in other media, can . . . silence the voice of competing speakers
with a mere flick of the switch."37 7 This permitted the government, the
Court concluded, to take steps to prevent the "potential . . . abuse of this
private power over a central avenue of communication" - steps that
would not be permissible if applied to other kinds of mass media.3 7 8
Although on its face more plausible than the scarcity argument the
Court made in NBC and Red Lion, the Turner argument is, ultimately,
equally unconvincing. As Ronald Adelman points out, although it is
true that at one point in time cable companies did possess significant
control over the broadcast television content that entered their consumers' homes, this was not a consequence of the physical characteristics of
the technology they provided.37 9 Instead, it was a product of the promonopoly policies that many municipalities adopted in the early years
of the cable industry - policies, moreover, that, by the early r 990s, were
increasingly a thing of the past.38 0 By the time the Court decided
Turner, there was no reason to presume that cable companies possessed
any more gatekeeping power over the media that flowed into their consumers' homes than did newspapers or any other mass media companies
that operate in highly concentrated markets. And there is certainly very
little basis for thinking so today, in a world of streaming, satellite communication, and the iPhone.
In other regulatory contexts, the Court has made similarly unsatisfying arguments to justify redistributive speech laws while maintaining,
in principle, its commitment to an antiredistributive view of the First
Amendment. In Hudgens v. NLRB, for example, the Court denied the
possibility that the First Amendment might require a private mall owner
to permit a union that wanted to picket a store in the mall access to his
property.38 1 The Court insisted that to read a right of access into the
First Amendment in these circumstances would impose too great a burden on the property rights, and expressive freedom, of mall owners. 3 2
But it remanded the case to the NLRB to decide whether the NLRA

376 Turner, 520 U.S. at 185.
377 Turner, 512 U.S. at 656.
378 Id. at 657.

379 See Ronald W. Adelman, Essay, Turner Broadcasting and the Bottleneck Analogy: Are Cable
Television OperatorsGatekeepers of Speech?, 49 SMU L. REV. 1549, 1550-51 (1996).
380 Id. at 55o.
381 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976).
382 Id.
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granted the union picketers a right of access, without explaining why a
statutory right of access posed any less of a threat to the speech and
property rights of mall owners than a constitutional right of access. 38 3
The Court simply insisted that the NLRB was better positioned than
the federal courts to resolve the conflict between the mall owner's private property rights and the associational rights of workers. 3 4
A few years later, in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, the Court
concluded that, although the First Amendment did not grant speakers
any rights of access to a privately owned mall, the California
Constitution could grant speakers a right of access without violating the
First Amendment. 38 5 The mall owner's First Amendment rights were
not threatened by the grant of access, the Court explained, because,
given the facts of the case - specifically, the fact that the mall was a
"business establishment that [was] open to the public to come and go as
they please" - the owner was not likely to be associated with the message the speakers communicated and, in any event, could easily "disavow any connection with the message [the protestors communicated] by
simply posting signs in the area where the speakers . . . stand." 3 6 The
Court did not explain, however, how this conclusion was consistent with
its conclusion, just a few years earlier, that because the First
Amendment protected "both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all," private persons could not be required to
carry messages they disliked on their property, even if those messages
were ones they could easily disavow.38 7 As Justice Powell argued in his
concurrence, the decision appeared to rather cavalierly deny owners of
shopping malls the full panoply of free speech and association rights
that other property owners possessed, without acknowledging that was
what it was doing. 38 8
These decisions suggest how difficult the Court has found the task
of reconciling the First Amendment and non-First Amendment free
speech traditions. They make evident how inconsistent - even incoherent - the result of the Court's efforts to do so have been, particularly
when it comes to the regulation of the mass media.

383 Id. at 523. The only explanation the Court provided was that "[t]he task of the [NLRB] and
the reviewing courts under the [NLRA]" is very different than "the duty of a court in applying the
standards of the First Amendment." Id. at 521. This distinction may be true but does not explain
why a statutory grant of access is any less threatening to the rights of private mall owners than a
constitutional grant.
384 Id. at 521-22.

385 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
386 Id. at 87.
387 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (citing W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 633-34 (1943); id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring)).
388 PruneYard, 447 U.S. at ioo-oi (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that "the right to control one's own speech may be burdened impermissibly even
when listeners will not assume that the messages expressed on private property are those of the
owner," id. at ioo, and expressing concern about the possible reach of the opinion, id. at 101).
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What these decisions also demonstrate, however - and demonstrate
particularly vividly because of how incoherent and unsatisfying they
tend to be - is how committed the Court has been to the task of reconciling, in these contexts at least, the First Amendment and non-First
Amendment free speech traditions. It clearly would have been far easier
doctrinally for the Court to have concluded, in all the cases discussed
above, that the challenged law was unconstitutional because of the constraints it imposed on the expressive autonomy and property rights of
private persons. And yet, the Court chose, again and again, not to do
so, presumably because it recognized the important role that these laws
play in the operation of the speech marketplace.
The Court, of course, has not always been willing to uphold redistributive speech laws. In Tornillo, it adamantly rejected the possibility
that the government might, in an effort to "encourage[] and implement[]
freedom of expression," 3 9 require newspapers in the state to offer those
they criticized in their editorial pages a right of reply. 390 And in numerous campaign finance cases, the Court has invalidated laws that restrict
the amount that donors or candidates can spend on election-related
speech when it has found they cannot be justified except as efforts to
redistribute expressive opportunity.391 In none of these cases did the
Court show any desire to defer to the legislative view that these kinds
of redistributive laws were necessary to vindicate democratic principles
or ensure a healthy and robust public sphere.
In other contexts, however, the Court has been willing to defer, and
to defer quite significantly. Indeed, a striking feature of all the decisions
discussed above is the very significant amount of discretion they grant
regulatory agencies like the FCC and the NLRB, and state courts like
the ones in California, to decide for themselves when the redistribution
of speech and property rights is necessary to further free speech values.
In NBC, for example, the Court suggested that the only constitutional
constraint on the FCC's power to constrain the expressive freedom of
radio broadcasters when the FCC deemed it in the "public interest" 392
was that it not be exercised to discriminate against speakers because of
their "political, economic or social views, or upon any other capricious
basis." 393 In Red Lion, the Court interpreted the First Amendment
somewhat more fulsomely, to guarantee the "right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas

389 Brief for Appellee Pat L. Tornillo, Jr., at 3, Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (No. 73-797).
390 See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
391 See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 207 (2014) (plurality opinion); Ariz. Free Enter.
Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 741 (2011).
392 Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943).
393 Id. at 226.
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and experiences" on the radio. 39 4 What the Court interpreted this to
require of the FCC, however, was only that it fulfill its statutory duties
under the Communications Act, as the agency had understood those duties for over twenty years. 395 In Hudgens, meanwhile, the Court emphasized - as it has in many of its NLRA cases - the significant discretion the NLRB possessed to determine when the property and speech
interests of employers or third parties had to give way to vindicate the
expressive and associational rights of workers. 396 And in PruneYard,
the Court appeared to apply nothing more than minimum rationality
review to the question of whether the grant of a state constitutional right
of access to the protestors violated the mall owner's First Amendment
rights. 39 7 The result was to vest the California courts with very broad
power to decide when and where state constitutional right of access applied, without having to worry about infringing upon the First
Amendment rights of property owners. 39 8
As these decisions show, in many contexts, the Court has embraced
a much more departmentalist approach to the protection of freedom of
speech than its strong assertion of judicial supremacy in Barnette would
suggest. It has recognized, sometimes overtly, sometimes tacitly, the important role that majoritarian institutions play and always have played
in the American system of free expression.
The result is a body of First Amendment law that, in fact, has never
been as strongly antiredistributive as cases like Tornillo, or the recent

394 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
395 Indeed, the Court's argument in Red Lion that the fairness doctrine furthered the First
Amendment right of the listening public to receive access to a diverse array of views on the radio
echoed, almost verbatim, the argument the FCC had made in 1949. See Editorializing by Broad.
Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949).
396 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522-23 (1976) ("[T]he primary responsibility for [accommo-

dating worker speech rights and private property rights] must rest with the Board in the first instance. 'The responsibility to adapt the Act to changing patterns of industrial life is entrusted to
the Board."' (internal citations omitted) (quoting NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266
(1975))); see also NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969) ("In fashioning its
remedies under the broad provisions of [the NLRA], the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and
expertise all its own, and its choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing
courts."); Julius G. Getman & Stephen B. Goldberg, The Myth of LaborBoard Expertise, 39 U. CHI.
L. REV. 681, 681 (1972) (critiquing the Court's tendency to defer to the NLRB's "special expertise
to determine the impact of employer conduct on the exercise of employee rights guaranteed by the
[NLRA]").
397 Eule & Varat, supra note 9, at 1569.
398 As far as I know, in the years since PruneYard was handed down, no California or federal
court has ever found a California state constitutionally mandated right of access to conflict with
the First Amendment. This is despite Justice Powell's assiduous efforts in his partial concurring
opinion in PruneYard to identify the factual circumstances in which a mandated right of access to
a privately owned shopping mall would, in his view, violate the First Amendment rights of the
owner. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 97-101 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).

2378

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 134:2299

campaign finance cases, suggest. It may be the case that laws that "restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others [are] wholly foreign to the First Amendment," 39 9
in the sense that they are not native to it; they are not required by it.
But it is not in fact true that laws of this sort are "wholly foreign" to the
First Amendment, in the sense that they are never permitted by it. In
practice, as the previous two Parts make clear, modern First
Amendment law permits, and has always permitted, a significant
amount of redistribution in the name of freedom of speech and association. It has also allowed significant interference with the "editorial control and judgment"4 0 0 of members of the press.
This is important to recognize, not only as a descriptive matter but
also as a doctrinal one. This is because claims about the historical operation of the system of free expression play an important role in the
Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.
To divine what
kinds of speech regulations are today constitutionally permissible, the
Court often asks what kinds of speech regulations were permitted in the
past. 40 1
The descriptive assertion that certain kinds of speech regulations are,
and always have been, "wholly foreign to the First Amendment" has, as
a consequence, significant doctrinal weight. In its recent campaign finance cases, for example, the Court has relied upon this claim to conclude that redistributive purposes may never justify campaign finance
laws, no matter how insignificant the constraint those laws impose on the
expressive freedom of the wealthy or how profoundly they benefit the
system of representative democracy.40 2 The result has been to exclude
from the judicial review of campaign finance legislation any analysis of
what may be the most powerful - and certainly, historically, has been
one of the primary - justifications for these laws. 4 0 3 In other words,
399 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
400 Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258
(1974).
401 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-72 (2010);
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1957); see also DICKERSON,
supra note 22, at xi-xii (arguing that "[i]n no other area of constitutional law-making have historical
traditions played so great a part in the [Court's] reasoning process" as they have in the First
Amendment cases).
402 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340-41 (2Q10); Buckley,
424 U.S. at 48-49.
403 See David A. Strauss, Essay, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance
Reform, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1994) ("[I]t is far from clear that campaign finance reform is about the
elimination of corruption at all. That is because corruption . . . is a derivative problem. Those who
say they are concerned about corruption are actually concerned about two other things: inequality,
and the nature of democratic politics. If somehow an appropriate level of equality were achieved,
much of the reason to be concerned about corruption would no longer exist."). There is no question
that inequality - in particular, the tremendous inequality between the large corporations that
emerged in the Gilded Age and ordinary voters - was an important motivation behind the development of the modern campaign finance regime. See David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The
End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. & POLY REV. 236, 253-54 (1991). Like
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the claim that the modern free speech tradition has always been laissezfaire can be used - and may well be used, by the Court in the future
to wipe out the non-laissez-faire elements of the system that currently
exist. Just because the Court has been willing to tolerate free speech
departmentalism in the past does not by any means guarantee that it
will do so in the future.
Yet, as the previous Parts make clear, the claim that the First
Amendment forbids redistributive speech laws rests on an overly narrow - even somewhat mythological - view of the First Amendment,
and of the American system of free expression as a whole.
Redistributive speech laws are not alien to our regulatory traditions.
Instead, they date back as far as the First Amendment itself, or even
further, if we include the colonial voter intimidation laws. 4 0 4 Of course,
the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century postal laws did not stop anyone
from speaking; but they did make it much more expensive for some
(letter writers, novelists, book publishers) to speak than for others. 4 0 5
Meanwhile, the early nineteenth-century worker-protection laws did
quite overtly restrict the speech of some (employers) in order to enhance
the voice of others (workers). 406 In many cases, that is all that they
did.407 And over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
lawmakers enacted many other laws that did the same. 40
Nevertheless, because this rich body of free speech law has been for
the most part entirely excluded from the history of freedom of speech in
the United States - or when it is included in that history, is included
solely because of its connection to, or appearance in, an important
Supreme Court case - it has been extremely easy for both courts and
scholars to assume that the American system of free expression both is
today, and has always been, organized around exclusively laissez-faire
principles; that freedom of speech means freedom from regulation.
Even Justice Frankfurter, arch opponent of judicial supremacy in
Barnette, appeared to take for granted in his NBC decision that what
the First Amendment ordinarily requires is the absence of any government regulation of "modes of expression." 4 0 9
This assumption is problematic not only because it provides a powerful rhetorical weapon the Court can use to eviscerate the many redistributive speech laws that currently operate to promote free speech
many of the laws discussed in Part I, campaign finance regulations reflect legislative efforts to safeguard the principle of political equality that was understood to underpin our system of government
against the corrosive power of private wealth.
404 See supra p. 2308.
405 See supra pp. 2313-15.
406 See supra p. 2336.
407 See supra p. 2337.
408 See supra pp. 2337-39.

409 Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
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values by non-laissez-faire means but also because it produces a body of
free speech law that is unduly confident about the benefits, and unduly
complacent about the costs, of a system of laissez-faire speech regulation. The failure of courts to recognize that the common carrier laws,
the worker speech protection laws, the voter intimidation laws, and the
postal laws are redistributive speech laws, just as surely as the campaign
finance laws are, sustains the presumption that underpins the modern
cases that redistribution is not in fact necessary to ensure an "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 41 0 public debate on public matters, or any
of the other democratic values the First Amendment safeguards, even
when the history in Part I strongly suggests that this presumption is
false: that laissez-faire principles are, in many contexts, inconsistent with
democratic values because they allow economic inequalities to translate
too easily into the public sphere.
The presumption that redistributive speech laws are alien to our regulatory traditions is also a problem because it warps the doctrine.
Because, in practice, the Court has not been willing to invalidate the
many redistributive speech laws described in the previous pages, it has
been forced - when confronted with redistributive speech laws it believes do in fact serve important or legitimate interests - to either deny
that redistribution is occurring (as, for example, in the PruneYard
case 4 11), or to find some feature of the law or regulatory context to explain why redistribution is permitted in this case but not in others (as
for example in the radio and television broadcasting cases 41 2 ).
The result is a wildly inconsistent body of law, in which courts either
show no deference at all to the judgment made by other governmental
actors that redistributive speech laws are necessary to vindicate democratic values or other important ends or, alternatively, show tremendous
deference to that judgment by more or less taking the First Amendment
off the table as a regulatory constraint.
This is far from ideal.
Obviously, any law that shuts up the voices of some, in order to achieve
any purpose including a redistributive one, poses a risk to the health
and vitality of the democratic public sphere, and to the expressive freedom of those it regulates. In part because they are the product of majoritarian institutions, these kinds of laws can be abused and manipulated for partisan gain.
They can be exploited to further other
ideological agendas. And they can have unintended effects. But they
are also, as this Article shows, one of the ways in which local, state, and
federal governments have long attempted, and continue to attempt, to
ensure the expressive freedom that a democratic society requires.
Ideally, one would want a First Amendment doctrine that could
more rationally and consistently recognize the important role that laws

410

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,

411 See supra p. 2375.
412 See supra pp. 2371-2374.

270

(1964).
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of this sort play in the American system of free expression, while still
providing some measure of protection against their manipulation and
abuse. Crafting such a relationship would require courts to recognize
more forthrightly than they have been willing to do so far the existence
of the non-First Amendment free speech tradition. This Article is the
first step toward enabling them to do just that.
CONCLUSION

-

In 2016, Senator Al Franken was harshly criticized by a journalist
for describing the FCC's decision to enact net neutrality regulations as
"the First Amendment issue of our time." 4 13 As the reporter pointed out,
the only way in which the FCC's decision to enact the net neutrality
regulations might implicate the First Amendment was if a court found
the policy an infringement of the private media companies it regulated. 4 14 Given current state action rules, the First Amendment obviously did not compel the FCC to enact (or for that matter, to rescind)
the net-neutrality rules, or any other common carrier law.
This is certainly true; and yet, what Senator Franken was clearly
attempting to say was that the question of net neutrality is the free
speech issue of our time. That he invoked the First Amendment to do
so is a sign of how thoroughly the First Amendment dominates popular,
as well as judicial, discourse on freedom of speech in the United States.
As this Article has shown, this is a problem, not only because it impoverishes the scholarly understanding of the capacious, complicated, departmentalist American system of free expression, but also because it
produces as a result an inconsistent, even incoherent, body of First
Amendment law.
The American system of free expression is, and always has been,
bigger than just the First Amendment. Courts neither are, nor is it
plausible to expect them to be, the only government actors with responsibility for creating the conditions of expressive freedom under which
democratic government can flourish. It is past time for all of us
politicians, legal scholars, ordinary citizens, and federal judges - to
recognize that fact.

413 Daniel Lyons, The First Amendment Red Herring in the Net Neutrality Debate, FORBES
(Mar. 1a, 2017, 9:07 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2017/o3/Jo/the-firstamendment-red-herring-in-the-net-neutrality-debate [https://perma.cc/8EWR-Hg 88].
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